Senate's FAA Reauth.

Here's the Senate's version of the FAA Reauthorization Bill.  We just got this and have had zero time to go over it.  Enjoy all 239 pages of it! FAA2009 Senate

LEGISLATIVE ALERT! Senate Introduces FAA Reauthorization Bill

For Immediate Release July 14th, 2009
ROCKEFELLER, HUTCHISON, DORGAN, DEMINT INTRODUCE BIPARTISAN AVIATION BILL Key Focus on Increasing Safety and Modernization
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV (D-WV), Ranking Member Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), Chairman of the Aviation Operations, Safety and Security Subcommittee Byron Dorgan (D-ND), and Ranking Member of the Aviation Operations, Safety and Security Subcommittee Jim DeMint (R-SC) joined together today to introduce legislation that will reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The bipartisan legislation will accelerate modernization of the nation’s air traffic control (ATC) system, address critical safety concerns in the national airspace system (NAS), and improve rural community access to air service.  “This bill goes a long way toward improving safety, reducing congestion, and modernizing our aviation system so we adapt to future growth in air travel,” said Senator Rockefeller, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.  “For over 15 years, I have been fighting to improve air travel for passengers, airports and airlines.  This bill reinforces the “one level of safety” standard across all commercial aircraft operations, updates our nation’s antiquated air traffic control system, and most importantly protects consumers, placing efficiency and modernization center stage.  We must work quickly to pass this bill and have it signed into law for the safety and future of America’s air passengers.” “This bill represents an important commitment to modernizing our nation’s air traffic control system and improving the safety of air travel across the country,” said Senator Hutchison.  “The benefits of Next Generation air traffic control include increased efficiency and expanded capacity, along with critical safety enhancements that are long overdue.  This legislation must be a top priority for Congress, because it will provide the FAA with the resources it needs to improve America’s current air travel system and prepare for the future.” “This FAA reauthorization bill is critical to transforming and modernizing our air traffic control system. Our current radar-based system is outdated and does not deliver the kind of service necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of a modern air-transport system,” said Senator Byron Dorgan, Chairman of the Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee. “This bill also addresses safety, the number one issue for my subcommittee. The bill improves access to pilot records for hiring decisions, enhances the FAA’s oversight of pilot testing, training schools and safety inspections of regional carriers. It also requires the FAA to address the recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, all with the goal of improving the safety our skies. This is a bill that the millions of people who fly every day can be proud of.”  “This is important legislation that rightly focuses on modernizing the air traffic control system and aviation safety, while avoiding extraneous provisions that could slow its progress in the Senate," said Senator Jim DeMint.  "I'm very pleased that the bill incorporates many necessary improvements in safety in response to the crash of Flight 3407, which will help ensure we learn from this tragedy and save lives in the future.  Hopefully the provisions dealing with pilots records, fatigue and regional airlines will protect against another accident like Flight 3407.” KEY PROVISIONS OF THE BILL: Aviation Safety Requires the FAA develop a plan to provide runway incursion information to pilots in the cockpit, and initiate improved processes for tracking and investigating operational errors.  Mandates an independent study of the latest scientific research on pilot fatigue be applied to FAA’s required rulemaking on flight time limits and rest requirements for flight crews.  Improves safety for helicopter emergency medical service operations by mandating that the FAA standardize dispatch procedures, and requiring the use of terrain awareness and warning systems, and flight data and cockpit voice recorders on board such helicopters. Addresses inconsistent application of Airworthiness Directives (ADs) by: improving voluntary disclosure reporting processes to ensure adequate actions are taken in response to reports; limiting the ability of FAA inspectors to work for air carriers which they had oversight; and conducting independent reviews of safety issues identified by employees. Requires enhanced safety oversight of foreign repair stations. Takes steps to ensure “one level of safety” exists in commercial aircraft operations including a mandate that all carriers adopt additional safety oversight programs and by promoting cooperation among carriers to share best practices and other critical safety information. Air Traffic Control Modernization and FAA Reform Improves federal oversight of the NextGen initiative. Accelerates implementation of NextGen technologies.  Establishes clear deadlines for the adoption of existing Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation technology, including Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and Area Navigation (RNAV), by mandating 100 percent coverage at the top 35 airports by 2014, with the entire National Airspace System (NAS) required to be covered by 2018. Directs FAA to accelerate planned timelines for integrating Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) technology into the NAS, requiring the use of “ADS-B Out” on all aircraft by 2015 and “ADS-B In” on all aircraft by 2018.  Creates an “Air Traffic Control Modernization Oversight Board” to provide oversight of FAA’s modernization activities. Establishes a “Chief NextGen Officer” position at FAA to be responsible for the implementation of all NextGen programs, and requires federal agencies participating in NextGen to designate a single office in their Department to be accountable for NextGen. Requires the FAA to complete a comprehensive study of ATC facility realignment or consolidation in relation to airspace system modernization. Establishes a new process to make sure collective bargaining labor disputes at the FAA are adequately resolved through mediation and arbitration if necessary. Airline Service and Small Community Air Service Requires air carriers to develop contingency plans to address situations in which the departure of a flight is substantially delayed while passengers are confined to an aircraft, and allow passengers to deplane after a three hour delay. Mandates improved disclosure of flight information when tickets are purchased. Proposes a number of improvements to the Essential Air Service (EAS) to allow communities greater flexibility in attracting desired air service. Substantially increases authorized funding for EAS to $175 million annually, a $48 million increase.  Maintains support for the Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP) which is authorized at $35 million annually through FY 2011.  Airport Improvements Streamlines the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) process by simplifying approval requirements for imposing or amending PFCs, while still retaining audit controls, and FAA project and expenditure oversight.  The title does not change or increase the maximum allowable PFCs that are currently permitted under the program’s authority. Provides greater flexibility for the use of various AIP entitlement funding, and establishes a number of pilot programs to consider concepts for strengthening the program. ###

Hold off for a week.

We're glad to see that someone got the message to hold off on the implementation of the change to the FAA's Quality Assurance Order and the start of the safety culture.  HQ telegraphed (?) a message to field facilities to delay it for one week.  See below.  That'll give us time to get together (again) all of our safety issues to be delivered (again) to the TRACON manager to fix.   


Something one week won't buy us is better sales job on the safety culture concept that HQ is trying to articulate.  A half-ass delivery method from people that aren't on board (and have been left to their own devices to tailor their own message to air traffic controllers on what the change notice says) will get half-ass results.  It's probably a good thing that this QA order will be revised in October.  That's plenty of time for the HQ staff trying to enact a culture change to get their shit together, give their facility managers opportunity to be schooled, and have facility managers--rather than know-nothing briefers-- take the time to pass the information to operational personnel and answer the questions that we all have.

Here's the QA order change 'talking points' that the briefers had to work with.  
QAorderpoints

As expected.

Briefings for the change to the FAA's Quality Assurance Order (7210.56C) began promptly at 0730 at Potomac TRACON. We wrote yesterday about our take on the "culture change" that the FAA is trying to usher in with this Order as the method of delivery. FAA management delivered as expected with today's briefings.

Word from the first batch of controllers indoctrinated in to the "just culture" of the new FAA had lots to report--little good. After spending 5 minutes trying to figure out how to turn on the lights in the room and a couple of snide remarks from the contact training staffer about some nonsense that working at Washington Center would be better for some in attendance (whatever the hell that's supposed to mean) the PowerPoint presentation was a go.

Talk about a monumental effort to take that first precious (mis)step toward a "just culture." The management team couldn't have accomplished a bigger failure if they tried. Cut and paste from the order onto a PowerPoint, read by a non-authoritative briefer from the training department (sometimes a contractor, sometimes a FAA briefer) unable to answer simple questions, offering opinions that this talk of culture change is really nothing different than what's going on today except for the removing controller names from OE packages, how unfair this process is to those seeking age 56 waivers, Jim Beddow- B E D D O W- wrote this and (I've) never seen an order like this before, how stupid this all is because there will be a new order in a couple months, ATSAP will be briefed in December so why we are doing this is a mystery, and on and on....

We have to question why Bob Tarter, Office of Safety VP, was in such a hurry to get this order briefed. And why is the briefing left to contract training staff to do? We would think that this big change to the way we all look at safety would be something that has buy-in from the top down. Nope. Not a chance. Imagine the Potomac TRACON air traffic manager (or an air traffic manager at an air traffic control facility near you) standing in front of his subordinate employees and explaining the just and safe culture that the FAA is embarking on. Thoughtful questions asked by controllers and instant responses received from the air traffic manager. Nope. Nothing doing. All the TRACON management team cares about is complying with orders from above. Get this thing briefed by the 14th. That's why this whole idea of "safety culture" is doomed to failure. Probably wasn't part of the plan anyway.

Now that the FAA is stuck in the run-it-like-a-failed-business model, with operational errors at all time high levels, something has to be done to bring those numbers down. Sell the controllers on the idea that OE's are no big deal and throw in some tough talk about four levels of review for every operational error. Oh, and those credentials that you have and didn't think anything of? Get ready to find out what they're for. The FAA wants to reduce the number of operational errors? Oh, the numbers will go down alright. As the number of unreported incidents rise. Unreported by controllers who got the message. Unreported by supervisors who got the message.

I'm sure many facilities are just like Potomac TRACON where management got this document last Wednesday with instructions to brief controllers, supervisors, and managers by tomorrow. If Bob and Hank and J. and whoever else really believes that a safety culture is what is needed then you all have blown it. From the moment this document arrived TRACON managers had questions about certain parts of it--still unanswered. Supervisors had questions--still do. No answers. Controllers have questions. Go ask your supervisor is the answer. Just great. Way to be prepared. We wonder if some facility managers had some balls to tell HQ to pound sand, get the answers to our questions, and then we'll implement.

Let's try this for the start of a safety culture at Potomac TRACON. Numerous reports of failed air traffic control procedures have been delivered to Potomac TRACON managers over the past couple years from union representatives, controllers, and supervisors. All of these reports have been ignored and have been left for controllers to figure out a way to work around the safety problems. It's time for TRACON managers to get fixing what they know is broke. No more workgroups, no more meetings, no more delays, no more band-aid solutions. Want to show that you're moving toward a just culture, a safety culture? Rod, Steve, Anthony, Brian? Can't talk to air traffic controllers about a safety culture? Okay then, let your actions speak louder than words. If Rod has misplaced that list of a dozen or so broken procedure/safety issues that he got from the FacRep a month or so ago stop by the union office for a new copy and then get to work.

Even though today's rollout of the "safety culture" at Potomac TRACON was done as poorly as could be this still is an opportunity to improve aviation safety. We'll believe it when we see it.

A Just Culture

On July 1, '09, FAA's Vice President for the ATO Office of Safety Bob Tarter signed off on the agency's move, in his words, "toward a just culture." This change is embodied in a change to FAA Order 7210.56C, Air Traffic Quality Assurance. Read the complete document here and/or read on for the highlights of it.

Before we get into what's about to happen let's look at what the FAA has already done when faced with an ever increasing rate of operational errors in the national airspace system. When the FAA forced it's work and pay rules on air traffic controllers on June 6, '06, the agency coerced air traffic controllers to not report operational errors by withholding money. To some this is called 'pay-for-performance.' In Article 64 of the FAA's work and pay rules it is written that air traffic controllers would not be eligible to receive an annual pay increase if they were decertified for performance reasons. Air traffic controllers are typically decertified after being found responsible for an operational error. Consequently, the reporting of errors was reduced. But it wasn't working to keep the numbers below the FAA's 'benchmark.'

On June 25, '07, a new term was added to the air traffic lexicon: Proximity Event. Many described this as the FAA "rebaselining" the numbers of operational errors. Proximity Events were greeted with a sigh of relief and cheer from air traffic controllers. What used to be an operational error with a chance for decertification and loss of pay was history in all but the more serious mistakes. Seemed like a good idea at the time. But somehow the wrong idea was transmitted by the FAA to the field. In the instance when a possible operational error was reported to a supervisor it would quickly be determined whether or not the classification was a PE (proximity event) or an OE (operational error.) If it was a PE then the feeling was like it never happened. Even though factors that led up to the PE could have turned an event into something more serious (an OE) but for luck or chance. The creation of the Proximity Event category for an air traffic incident didn't do anything to improve safety. Proximity Events mask the true state of safety in the national airspace system. But they do keep money in our pockets so it's an argument that we wouldn't be able to win.

March 27. '08, brought us the Air Traffic Safety Action Program, ATSAP for short. It is a non-punitive voluntary reporting program for air traffic controllers established jointly with NATCA and the FAA. This program is getting good reviews from air traffic controllers at the 30-something facilities that have received the training and are utilizing the program. The FAA gives it accolades too:

"I'm pleased with the progress we've made so far," said Bob Tarter, vice president for the Office of Safety. "ATSAP allows us to focus on 'why’ errors happen, not on ‘who’ made them. It is my hope that making this transition will improve the safety of the system."

We're not sure what everyone thinks is "good" about ATSAP. It's non-punitive so that's good. It's documenting problems in the system. But what does it do to improve safety? What is done--and by whom--to address the numerous ATSAP reports? The MOU says one thing but what is really done in the field? It's hard to imagine the FAA--looking at Potomac TRACON as an example--fixing something in accordance with the ATSAP MOU. Time will tell.

We don't want to give the ATSAP program the short shrift but what you need (or want) to know of it can be found on the ATSAP website.  And a note to our readers, if anyone would care to reconcile this change to the QA order with the ATSAP MOU please drop us an e-mail and we'll blog it.

The ink was not even dry on the ATSAP MOU when it was discovered by NATCA that the FAA was acting disingenuously and in conflict with the ATSAP agreement. A NATCA press release declared that the FAA had developed guidance on how to discipline controllers for performance related issues. Here's the press release and here's the FAA guidance memo. Not exactly a way for the FAA to build trust. (Which all seems kind of odd--building trust--since at the time we were working for an employer who walked away from the contract bargaining table and imposed it's work and pay rules on air traffic controllers.)

Then, on January 7, '09, the FAA again tried to shake off some bad press over it's pay-for-performance scheme by implementing a "policy change"-- which under normal circumstances would be a contract violation--by striking the pay penalty if an air traffic controller is decertified for performance deficiencies (like occurs following on OE.) This move was viewed two ways: 1) If an operational error was deemed to be a performance issue and the FAA is compensating it's employees through a pay-for-performance system (putting aside for a moment that it's a flawed system) then why would an employee who demonstrated poor performance be rewarded?; and 2) The FAA realized that safety was being compromised since air traffic controllers were not reporting errors due to the fear of losing money so something had to change before the word got out. Neither of these is good and are a result of the FAA's rush to implement a pay plan to show just how they could run air traffic control like a business. Money was put ahead of safety and even though it's true (run it like a business, remember?) that's not the perception the FAA wants out there.

Something still isn't working. Errors are skyrocketing. Take a look at the FAA's scorecard on operational errors. This is bad.

Now what? Even before a new air traffic controller contract is sent to the members for ratification the FAA is embarking on this huge change to the way operational errors are processed. This is a matter that affects working conditions of air traffic controllers. We're not so sure this was negotiated or it's another one of the last efforts of the FAA before the new contract. Either way it's fishy.

Beginning Tuesday, July 14, '09, the FAA will no longer associate the identity of air traffic controllers with reported operational errors/deviations and proximity events. No interview after an OE, no personnel statements, no "go find a rep and meet me in the tape room" from the supervisor, no training record entry, no record of it in a performance rating. Almost like it never happened. And there's a little relief to the facility management team too. There's no need to get the OE called in to HQ within four hours of it's occurrence. No big thing. Call it in the next day.

The explanation the FAA offers is this change is being made to take the focus off blame and put it on why something happened. That's nice, if it actually improves safety. We have to wonder how much the FAA leadership really backs this strategy. Giving it two weeks from signing to implementation is an awfully short time frame. Some sups and managers were just briefed on this change last Friday and were left scratching their heads. So how do we investigate an operational error if the controller can't be interviewed? So the controller doesn't have to tell us anything?

The majority of controllers at PCT--until now--don't even know about this so-called improvement to our safety culture. And how does this work with ATSAP? Don't know. The change document says that certain aspects of ATSAP have been incorporated so we will see how this all works. It's somewhat troubling that the FAA has yet to provide required ATSAP training to its employees but is implementing aspects of the program anyway. Kind of a half-ass way to go about improving the safety culture if you ask us. Could it be that the FAA is more concerned with display and perception that something is being done instead of doing it right to begin with?

To further downplay the significance of operational errors the FAA has come up with a new descriptive phrase that details the event severity (how much separation was not maintained.) Whoops, sorry. Too strong. Now it's called proximity outcome. That has a soothing sound to it now doesn't it? Nice and easy on the ears. Kind of like a proximity event. You hear those two words and concern for what happened is gone.

And what about interviews? A whole paragraph was written in the change document about interviews; that another section of the document says that are not required.

f. 5-1-5. INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Paragraphs b(1) through b(5) were replaced because there is no longer a requirement to interview employees in an OE/OD investigation.

Paragraph f was deleted because there is no longer a requirement to interview employees in an OE/OD investigation.

Paragraph n was deleted because employees will not be required to be interviewed.

This change document--hastily briefed to FAA supervisors and not at all to air traffic controllers--puts into words how important it is to be forthcoming with information that contributes to our improved safety culture. Now we see why a bunch of supervisors are still wondering what to do. If there is no longer a requirement to be interviewed then write a new paragraph about interviews?

If an event rises to the level of an operational error (after not interviewing controllers and unable to rule it as a non-event by selectively reviewing radar/audio data) the facility Air Traffic Manager SHALL designate a team to assist the Investigator-In-Charge in the investigation of each OE/OD. And the ATM SHALL as a minimum afford a Union designated representative reasonable opportunity to participate as a member of the investigative team. This ought to be real interesting. What a disservice to everyone that's affected by this change. No briefing, no training. Here it is. Just do it. As if everything will fall into place. Safety will never be compromised again.

An important thing for all to know, and which is part of the change document, is that for air traffic controllers to have a shred of hope in avoiding disciplinary action for performance that led to an OE the controller MUST submit a report of the incident to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, or an ATSAP report if working at a participating facility.  If you don't have this link bookmarked do it now.  It's to submit an online NASA ASRS form.  You see, even if other written words describe the FAA's just culture and avoiding blame and non-punitive reporting they just can't shake that threat of disciplinary action.   

Now here's the part that makes all of this safety culture talk questionable.  After the facility completes it's investigation of an OE it is forwarded to the Service Unit (formerly known as "The Region.)  The Service Unit will investigate what the facility has done, develop recommendations to prevent a reocurrence of the event, and forward a report to Safety Services (formerly known as "Headquarters".)  Safety Services, at it's discretion, will convene an investigation team that will look at what the Service Unit has done.  And their report and recommendations will be sent to the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV), what should be known as "Internal Affairs".  AOV is the group that issued credentials (those cards that almost no one carries or cares about) to air traffic controllers.  If an event makes it to the level of AOV looking at it then someone along the way didn't do a very good job of playing along with the safety culture game. Don't think for a second that you won't be held to task once AOV get's involved in investigating an OE that you are involved in.

We're all for improving safety. And it 's nice that the FAA doesn't want to hold air traffic controllers responsible for errors but the actions of the FAA don't match up to the words in the documents and directives coming out of HQ. Writing that the culture must change and posting a memo in a binder isn't going to do anything but make an already suspicious workforce that much more leery of what the agency heads are up to next. It's no wonder why when the FAA management--exemplified by those at Potomac TRACON--implement flawed air traffic control procedures that controllers must work around to get their job done safely. Procedures that contribute to errors by pilots and controllers are kept in place by a management team that is too afraid to change. A safety culture is the farthest thing from the minds of FAA managers at Potomac TRACON. For this would mean someone repairing what they've broke; and that would be work and tantamount to an admission of failure. So when your downwind runs out of the Class B on a routine basis, or you restate altitude restrictions that are already published on RNAV STAR, or you climb into another facility's airspace on a RNAV SID, or you vector off an RNAV arrival as soon as airplanes enter your airspace, just remember that this isn't how it's supposed to work. A safety culture--working collaboratively with air traffic controllers--would not have brought to you procedures that increase workload and degrade safety.

It's a good thing this change isn't effective until Tuesday.  That gives someone at FAA HQ all of Monday to put a hold on this until a proper explanation and answering of employee questions (especially those from supervisors and managers) can take place.  The sales job by not charging controllers with OEs doesn't pass muster.  We're not saying this is a wrong approach but moving forward with such expediency on this monumental change is not wise nor is it fair to all that are affected--controllers, staff specialists, supervisors, and managers. 

There may be some sound principles in the changes the FAA is trying to make.  But they won't happen with the same old top-down, one-way communications. 

Do the right thing Bob.  While someone is looking.

It's a new day at the FAA...

...DOT Secretary Ray LaHood tells CNN in response to questions about the agency's troubled past of retaliating against employees who blow the whistle on safety issues. Watch the video from CNN.

After watching that video it's a wonder how the FAA leadership can talk out of one side of their mouth touting the safety culture that must be created and from the other side direct that whistleblowers be quashed? It doesn't make any sense.

FAA whistleblowers have got the attention of the Congress. The House added language to its version of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009. It's Section 828 of HR 915: It is the sense of Congress that whistleblowers at the Federal Aviation Administration be granted the full protection of the law. This section (an amendment of HR 915) passed on a recorded vote of 420 to 0.

Here's what two members of Congress had to say about it when they spoke in favor of the amendment.

Representative Burgess (R-TX-26):...

"Individuals in the world of the Federal Aviation Administration should be able to speak up and speak out when safety is being compromised. Whether it is the Federal Government, a private company, or their fellow colleagues who compromise safety, these brave people are entitled to the full protection of the law when they inform the public as to how our safety is compromised.

In my district we have had several instances of constituents who have acted as whistleblowers. Some have had their claims fully investigated and overseen by the FAA. Some have not. Some have been punished for speaking out. Some have not. We must make certain that every whistleblower is treated fairly and equally. Each and every claim reported to the FAA should be properly reviewed. I asked in November of 2008 to conduct an oversight and investigations hearing focusing on whistleblowers."

...and, Representative Payne (D-NJ-10)

"Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of the Burgess amendment to ensure whistleblower protection for FAA employees, and I commend Dr. Burgess for offering this amendment. I have been deeply disturbed at the situation at Newark Liberty International Airport in my congressional district of Newark, New Jersey. The safety concerns raised by a number of our air traffic controllers, the professionals we rely on to get us safely to and from our destinations, have been virtually ignored.

We have a situation where wrong turns caused by pilots' confusion over the FAA's new procedure have resulted in near-collisions. Yet, when the air traffic controllers have expressed alarm, the response of FAA management has been to retaliate against the employees who are trying to guard the safety of the flying public. Let me also add that I am disappointed that New Jersey communities, especially those in Essex and Union counties in my congressional district, are being forced to bear an unfair share of the noise burden under the airspace redesign plan. I hope that the new FAA administrator will address both the whistleblower protection issue and the need to reexamine the airspace redesign plan."

No one spoke against the amendment.

And just in case there was any misunderstanding of the sense of Congress and a 420 to zero vote to protect FAA whistleblowers take a look at Section 331 in HR 915 which establishes the Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office. We'll have to wait (on the Senate) and see if this new office and process will be better than which currently exists.  It is a step in the right direction and, if properly administered, will improve safety.

The entire FAA Reauthorization bill is far from becoming law.  The Senate must write and pass it's version.  Then the House and Senate must reconcile the differences from each of their versions.  The final bill must then be passed by the full House and Senate before being signed into law by the President.  All of this assumes that the Whistleblower provisions remain intact to the final bill passage. 

What a sad state of affairs we're in.  It takes an act of Congress to get the FAA to do the right thing.

Tired of reports.

Air traffic controller fatigue is in the news again.  Not big news though.   The DOT Inspector General released its report titled Air Traffic Control: Potential Fatigue Factors on June 29th.  The inquiry and report was done at the request of Senator Durbin of Illinois and focused on three facilities: Chicago ARTCC, Chicago O'Hare ATCT, and Chicago TRACON.  Here is the full report.

The IG's audit was done between January 2008 and January 2009 which makes it hard to determine exactly when the FAA did certain things contained in the report.  Also, the pending NATCA/FAA contract resolution could complicate some of the actions that are recommended in the report. 

Here are a few items of interest from the IG report---

FAA is taking several actions at the national level to address NTSB recommendations regarding fatigue. These actions include amending FAA Order 7210.3 to (1) increase the time available for rest (between shifts) from 8 hours to 10 hours, (2) increase the time available for rest after working a midnight shift on the fifth day of the week from 12 hours to 16 hours for facilities that utilize a 6-day work week, and (3) allow controllers to sleep or rest when not controlling traffic. FAA has also developed a 40-minute, computer-based instruction refresher training module on the effects of fatigue on controller performance. At the time of our review, however, none of these actions had been implemented at the three facilities.

FAA refuses to do as the NTSB said in 2007 when it added to it's Most Wanted Transportation Improvements a call to work with NATCA to develop a program to address fatigue issues.  A letter from NATCA President Pat Forrey to NTSB Chairman Mark Rosenker regarding the NTSB recommendations on fatigue provides the reader with a clear understanding of the FAA's willingness to work with NATCA.  Read it here.  Big surprise!  The FAA could care less about working with NATCA on this.  But the FAA did convene a PR spin event (in June 2008-- one year after the NTSB called for working with NATCA to address fatigue issues) that showed to Congress that they're really trying hard to do something good for those air traffic controllers who are so tired working in understaffed facilities.  And what have we got to show from that?

A draft change to FAA Order 7210.3 was floated to the field by FAA HQ during the IG audit period.  It never was implemented but here it is anyway.

Fatigue7210chg

 


From the NTSB Most Wanted:
A-07-31 (FAA)
Issued April 10, 2007
Added to the Most Wanted List: 2007
Status:  Open—Acceptable Response
Develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for controllers and for personnel who are involved in the scheduling of controllers for operational duty that will address the incidence of fatigue in the controller workforce, causes of fatigue, effects of fatigue on controller performance and safety, and the importance of using personal strategies to minimize fatigue. This training should be provided in a format that promotes retention, and recurrent training should be provided at regular intervals.  (Source: Recommendation letter to the FAA regarding four runway incursions and Attempted Takeoff from Wrong Runway, Comair Flight 5191, Bombardier CL-600-2B19, Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 [NTSB/AAR-07/05]), April 10, 2007.

We're not sure how the FAA gets an acceptable response from the NTSB on this.  A CBI?  What a hoot that is.  The FAA told the DOT IG that have developed a 40-minute, computer-based instruction refresher training module on the effects of fatigue on controller performance. Has anyone seen this CBI?  Talk about putting minimal effort into this so-called fatigue problem.  Note to all: The FAA's CBI courses are not what we would call a format that promotes retention. They promote fatigue if anything. 

From another page of the IG report---

While FAA took actions at the national level by forming a work group in 2007 to address these recommendations, most of these initiatives have not yet been implemented and therefore have not filtered down to the facility level. The work group recommended that FAA Order 7210.3 be amended to (1) increase the time available for rest (between shifts) from 8 hours to 10 hours, (2) increase the time available for rest after working a midnight shift on the fifth day of the week from 12 hours to 16 hours for facilities that utilize a 6-day work week, and (3) allow controllers to rest when not controlling traffic during their shift. FAA Labor Relations plans to send a letter to NATCA to inform it of the proposed changes to FAA Order 7210.3 and provide an opportunity for NATCA to comment on the proposed changes or request negotiations.

Although FAA has not finalized changes to its scheduling practices, it has made progress with fatigue training and awareness. Specifically, FAA (1) added a 1-hour lesson on the effects of fatigue to the air traffic initial qualifications training courses at the FAA Academy; (2) developed a 40-minute, computer-based instruction refresher training module on the effects of fatigue on controller performance (scheduled to be implemented later this year); (3) developed and distributed a brochure for controllers to help them better understand the effect of shift work on fatigue; and (4) held a fatigue symposium in June 2008.

Not exactly a glowing report.  NATCA was excluded from actively participating on the workgroup formed in '07.  Consequently, nothing came of it.  The changes to scheduling practices have not come about.  And we don't believe merely changing scheduling practices as suggested by the FAA will adequately address the issues of fatigue. Even though it's taken the FAA forever and a day to get down to business it would be the equivalent of a knee-jerk reaction to just change the schedules of air traffic controllers and leave it at that. 

The IG report says the FAA has made progress with fatigue training and awareness.  Because the FAA told the IG that makes it so.  What a great relationship between the DOT IG and the FAA.  Nice and cozy.  A one hour lesson on the effects of fatigue added to the courses for new hires at the academy???  And when the new hire gets to his or her facility the reality quickly sets in that the FAA has no idea what fatigue issues are affecting air traffic controllers.  The IG  report spelled many of them out--and they are things that have been happening for a long time--but the FAA isn't going to fix it by working without NATCA participation nor will a CBI and a brochure fool anyone that the FAA is "working the issue." 

As if these recommendations haven't been handed down before, here's what the IG wrote:

We recommend that FAA:
1.Reevaluate the staffing ranges for Chicago O’Hare once the OMP is fully implemented to ensure that the range is appropriate and meets the new operational needs of the facility.
2.Approve the recommended changes to FAA Order 7210.3 and implement these changes at all air traffic control facilities. These changes include (a) increasing the minimum rest period between shifts from 8 to 10 hours, (b) increasing the time available for rest after working a midnight shift on the fifth day of a 6-day work week from 12 to 16 hours, and (c) allowing controllers to rest during their shift when not controlling traffic.
3.Provide mandatory refresher training to controllers annually to reinforce fatigue awareness and mitigation strategies. This training should include a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach to minimizing employee fatigue.
4.Expand operational error investigatory requirements to include more detailed information on fatigue factors, such as overtime, OJT, and work schedule that could create fatigue conditions to determine whether these factors are a contributory cause to operational errors, the frequency in which the factors are occurring, and whether or not the existence of the factors indicate a systemic problem. The reports should at a minimum include (a) whether the controller worked overtime during the previous day or worked more than 40 hours during the prior work week; (b) the length of time the controller conducted OJT, if applicable; and (c) the exact days and shifts worked by the controller during the week the operational error occurred.
5.Require all facilities to establish procedures to rotate controllers through challenging and less demanding positions during each shift to mitigate the potential for fatigue to occur.

Soon a replacement contract will be ratified (?) that will take the place of the FAA's imposed work rules.  In the meantime, this leaves us wondering how the FAA leadership envisions implementing these recommendations?  A contract requires these kind of things to be negotiated before implementation.  The IG audit was done when the imposed work rules were in full effect.  FAA says they're going to do this, implement that, require something else.  That all changes when a real contract is in place.  And that's coming real soon.  It would be a really stupid idea and a brilliant display of bad faith if the FAA were to do anything that they told the DOT IG they were going to do.  The FAA leadership is so good at ignoring and stalling on recommendations from other entities--this is a good time to follow suit.

A better way to approach this is to put a hold on all of these recommendations, wait until a contract is in place, and work from the 2007 NTSB recommendations for NATCA and FAA to work together to address the issues of fatigue in air traffic control. 

But no.  Here's one of the FAA's response to the IG report (the other's were just lip service):

OIG Recommendation 2: Approve the recommended changes to FAA Order 7210.3 and implement these changes at all air traffic control facilities.

FAA Response: Concur. The Notices and Document Change Proposals have been developed and are awaiting final internal approval. The FAA expects final action on these documents by September 30, 2009, and will provide copies to the OIG upon completion. These changes include (a) increasing the minimum rest period between shifts from 8 to 10 hours, (b) increasing the time available for rest after working a midnight shift on the fifth day of a 6-day work week from 12 to 16 hours, and (c) allowing controllers to rest during their shift when not controlling traffic.

The arbitrary implementation of this monumental (we say detrimental) change to air traffic controller's watch schedules by the FAA would be the worst possible step that could be taken in the midst of contract negotiations. 

No Leave For You.

FAA management's plan for responding to the H1N1 virus were put to the test at Potomac TRACON a few days ago.  So just what part of the plan?  Plan?  There is no plan.  There's lot's of planning to come up with a plan like we reported here on June 20th but the crack management team here had to fall back on their experience and compassion on dealing with people issues to figure out what to do.

Sadly, a child of a contract employee at PCT became ill and was later discovered to have acquired the H1N1 virus.  The child attended a local day care facility with a few other kids of PCT employees.  And the PCT pandem(ic)onium was born.  (editors note: The little one is fine.)

The PCT Air Traffic Manager swung into action with a call to the FAA's Office of Decision Making.  (It's THE place most often called by FAA managers.)  It was quickly decided to send any employee who had, will have, thought about having, or having thought about contacting anyone suspected of having the flu home on leave.  After a quick check of the watch schedule for the days ahead several employees were sent home on five days administrative leave (i.e. paid leave not charged against an employee's accrued leave balances.)

Then it was time to get the memo writers into action.  Taped to the front doors and other places where viruses breed were the ATM's memo sounding the alarm that the virus was here.  Keep washing your hands (as ordered by the NOTICE glued to the walls of the bathrooms) and the janitorial crews will be instructed to "add to their steps of cleaning."  Oh, and be sure to read the attached info from the Center for Disease Control before you sign on position at that CRU-ART keyboard that is never sanitized, then plug into that radar scope with the touch-screen comm panel that is never sanitized, and use the ARTS keyboard that is never sanitized, along with the ACE-IDS touch-screen monitors that are never sanitized, and the ink pens that are left at each radar scope and used by everyone else.  These would be some places for the management team to start with when they get serious about this. 

Why were several controllers forced to take paid administrative leave when they or their children weren't exhibiting flu symptoms?  FAA management has advised employees to go to the CDC for information. And since the FAA doesn't have a plan for dealing with pandemic flu you would think the FAA would follow the same guidance from the CDC that they're telling employees.  Like this one--

If I have a family member at home who is sick with novel H1N1 flu, should I go to work?
Employees who are well but who have an ill family member at home with novel H1N1 flu can go to work as usual. These employees should monitor their health every day, and take everyday precautions including washing their hands often with soap and water, especially after they cough or sneeze. Alcohol-based hand cleaners are also effective. If they become ill, they should notify their supervisor and stay home. Employees who have an underlying medical condition or who are pregnant should call their health care provider for advice, because they might need to receive influenza antiviral drugs to prevent illness.

Seems like good advice.  But the FAA management team did their own thing and sent perfectly healthy employees home for a few days of paid administrative leave.  Like many air traffic control facilities across the country this one from time to time has short staffing issues.  This might have had something to do with the change of the "plan" by the PCT air traffic manager.  He telephoned one of the quarantined controllers at home and told him "we've run out of administrative leave so you have to come back to work tomorrow."  WTF is right!  "Call the area and work out what shift you can come in for."  Sure thing Chief.

The supervisor, either trying to pull a fast one, cover for her boss, or who the hell knows why, told our quarantined lad that she could finagle it and allow him to stay on admin leave.  Word of that move spread quickly.  Ops Manager Carver soon put the kibosh on it and told her to call the controller--originally sent home as a preventive measure in response to the H1N1 virus--and give him the choice of taking annual leave or coming to work.  If the FAA HQ management thinks they can stall or shirk responsibility for getting a pandemic flu plan published it would be best to think again.  Look no farther than Potomac TRACON and you see why a plan--not a memo and a knee-jerk reaction--is needed BEFORE the H1N1 virus makes it into an FAA facility.  

Do you really think the FAA is doing anything to deal with pandemic flu?  Says so on the FAA website, right?  On the contrary.  The Government Accountability Office's Director of Strategic Issues provided testimony on June 16, 2009, to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  The written testimony is titled Influenze Pandemic- Greater Agency Accountability Needed to Protect Federal Workers in the Event of a Pandemic.  Read it all here.  Here are a few points of interest from it...

To get a more in-depth picture of agency planning, GAO selected three case study agencies that represent essential occupations other than first response that cannot be performed remotely. The three case study occupations—correctional workers, production staff disbursing federal checks, and air traffic controllers—showed differences in the degree to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans.

We also met with FAA representatives at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility in Warrenton, Virginia; the Washington Air Route TrafControl Center in Leesburg, Virginia; and Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center in Herndon, Virginia.

The report focuses on (1) the extent to which agencies have made pandemic plans to protect workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders; (2) the pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations performing essential functions other than first response; and (3) the opportunities to improve agencies’ workforce pandemic plans.

Air traffic control management facilities, where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans.

While FAA expects the demand for air traffic control, which manages cargo as well as passenger travel, to be reduced in the event of a severe pandemic outbreak, its contingency plans assume full air traffic levels as a starting baseline.

The Air Traffic Organization, FAA’s line of business responsible for the air traffic management services that air traffic controllers provide, had not directed facilities, such as its air route traffic control centers, to develop pandemic-specific plans or incorporate these pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans.

The Air Traffic Organization plans to direct its facilities to develop pandemic-specific plans or enhance their preexisting all-hazards contingency plans at the local field facility level after a number of actions, such as the development of an FAA workforce protection policy, are completed.

Concluding Observations and Prior Recommendations
The spring 2009 outbreak of H1N1 influenza accentuates the responsibility of agencies to have pandemic plans that ensure their ability to continue operations while protecting their workers who serve the American public. As evidenced by our survey results and case studies, some agencies are not close to having operational pandemic plans, particularly at the facility level. In addition, there is no real monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that agencies’ workforce pandemic plans are complete. A monitoring process should be in place that would ensure that federal agencies are making progress in developing their plans to protect their workforce in the event of a pandemic and that agencies have the information and guidance they need to develop operational pandemic plans.

The FAA management so badly wanted to take control of the workplace and did just that one barbecue and three years ago with the imposed work rules.  The FAA's response to this pandemic flu is why the current management team shouldn't be in control.  These people cannot be repeatedly asked to fix what they broke. 

Here's a real easy thing for Rod and his band to do.  Figure out if all the things that were listed above can be wiped down with those Lysol wipes that have been placed in the control room (that no one is using because we don't know if it'll damage the equipment) and we'll do the dirty work with our own protective measures during this pandemic.  It's a hell of a better plan than what we've got now.

Action Rod.

The results of the FAA sting operation--reported here June 10th--have been released by the PCT Air Traffic Manager in the typical condescending memo that he (and his predecessor) are known for.  Besides failing to bring to justice the supervisors responsible for the great caper of falsifying position logs--which is not just a midnight shift thing--the ATM again demonstrates that he is, by his own description, not an operational guy. 

We just love it when someone in authority tries to lay down the law to air traffic controllers.  As lawman Rod should know, air traffic controllers are held to a standard that is so much higher and with such a greater responsibility than what he or any of his cohorts behind the glass doors will ever know.  And we know when someone is bullshitting us. 

It seems that the FAA HQ inspector sent to PCT to listen to the air traffic control audio recordings from certain midnight shifts (after the PCT staff inquiry came up inconclusive - ?) found that supervisors were fixing the position logs to paint a picture that all is well, nothing to see, move along now.  It was discovered that controllers are working their asses off on the midnight shifts.  They are busier from midnight to 6 than any other time of the day.  There is more refresher training done on a shift with two controllers on duty than when there are a dozen on duty.

It's just amazing what has happened to management, controllers, and the union since the crash of Trooper 2 on September 28, 2008.  Cover-up, deceit, and ignorance.  Instead of acknowledging mistakes it quickly became a blame game.  And controllers took the brunt of it.  PCT management has not take responsibility for anything.  FAA management has tried to fix a few technical issues, such as weather reporting and MSAW beacon code assignments but in such a half-ass way that it unnceccesarily increases the workload of air traffic controllers.

Everything procedural/technical thing the FAA has changed since Trooper 2 crashed is for the purpose of minimizing culpability and reducing the payout when the jury finds the FAA as contributing to an environment that led to the crash of Trooper 2.  Mark our words.

Of course the supervisors are off the hook for the monkey business on the mid shifts.  Just following orders.  Why supervisors don't grow a pair and watch the bus runneth over the man responsible for this mess is beyond us.

Here's the memo to controllers, placed in their 'read and ignore' binder.  Rightfully so. 

A few things worth mentioning.  What is a critical non-operational position?  We'd ask our supervisors but this mid shift stuff shows they can't be trusted to be straight-up with us.  Precisely and accurately?  Man Rod, you have some really (un)amazing writers on your staff.  The use of those two words together are a sure sign of someone who is not real imaginative in their writing.  Like filling in words to make up for lack of substance.  (Some would say that's like this blog! HA!)

Recorded relief briefings are required on all positions..... All relief briefings shall be recorded, as required by the SOP..... A complete recorded relief briefing shall be accomplished on all positions.  Now there is some filling up of a paragraph, Rod.  Three sentences, same message.  By the way, it is ACE-IDS not ACIDS.  ACE-IDS is the computer screens above each radar scope that contain weather information and pretty much everything else that makes up the relief briefing--except the traffic (that's airplanes).

A 2 minute overlap is also required on mid shifts as well as all other shifts.  Excuse me, but what?  Also required on mids as well as other shifts?  We get it, 2 minute overlaps.  But, also as well as all other....come on.  You should really get a proof reader before you send out these memos.  Not a great advancement on your credibility Rod.

2 minute overlap on the mids go something like this.  After sitting at the scope for an hour or so with not an airplane in sight my relief comes in.  He's got the board (the ACE-IDS), I've got nothing more to add, and there's no traffic.  Relief complete.  And we're not waiting two minutes for this. 

And what's the point of inserting an excerpt of the SOP here?  Like we don't already know that when you get relieved you sign on the controller you relieved.  It's only been this way forever.  Must be some hidden meaning.  Sorry, don't get it.  Especially don't get it if it has something to do with the mids.

Notification of ATIS broadcast changes, were also inconsistent.  No kidding.  If there are no airplanes then who would we be making a broadcast to?  Right, no one.  So if there is no one  to broadcast to then why would the announcement of the ATIS code change be made?  Right, it wouldn't.  What is an inconsistency to you is common sense to us: airplanes = broadcast ATIS code change / no airplanes = do not broadcast ATIS code change.

And last but what should have been a separate memo all by itself:  The review also indicated a discrepancy in position logs.  On several occasions the controller that was signed on position was not the voice heard on the tape.    Imagine that.  It's no big secret why that is.  If this memo is your way, Rod, to fix this discrepancy (wink-nod) then you might as well drop this whole matter altogether cause it ain't working. 

See you at the barbecue!  I'll be the one not eating.
      

NATCA ELECTIONS: A new blog. The candidates speak out.

Do you know where your candidates for national office stand on some of the issues of our time? To help along with getting the information out before getting the vote out a website (blog) has been created by Mike Esau at POU ATCT. Here's the lead in from Mike on his blog...

NATCA's last election was an important one. There was truly a difference in our choices. Only 52 per cent of eligible members voted. This is unacceptable if one wishes our union to move forward. This is unacceptable if we want Congress or the aviation community to take us seriously.

So here's my contribution at helping "Get Out The NATCA Vote".

In the blog to follow are some questions I posed to the candidates for NATCA's President and Executive Vice President. I have and will publish any responses without comment. Some of the the candidates may not have responded yet. I will add their positions when they do. Candidates can also expound on, change or add to their original statements at a later date if they like. The comments have been turned off. Take any discussion or debate back to the BBS or contact the candidates themselves.

Mike Esau- POU ATCT

http://natcabu.blogspot.com/

CHECK OUT MIKE'S EFFORT, TAKE IN THE EXCHANGE, AND MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION AS YOU CAST YOUR VOTE FOR NATCA PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT.

More J. Under Oath

Picking up where we left.

Courtesy of Flight Aware.com, we see that indeed, as a would-be passenger on AAL63 commented to MiamiHerald.com, the NextGen/tailored arrival flight from Paris to Miami didn't happen. Jim, Mitch, anyone in Miami??? Any news on this test flight? Send us an e-mail about it.

13-Jun-2009	B763/W	Charles De Gaulle (LFPG)	Miami Intl (KMIA)	04:28 EDT	13:47 EDT	9:19
12-Jun-2009	B763/W	Charles De Gaulle (LFPG)	Miami Intl (KMIA)	04:22 EDT	14:10 EDT	9:48
10-Jun-2009	B763/W	Charles De Gaulle (LFPG)	Miami Intl (KMIA)	04:24 EDT	13:35 EDT	9:11
09-Jun-2009	B763/W	Charles De Gaulle (LFPG)	Miami Intl (KMIA)	04:21 EDT	14:00 EDT	9:39
08-Jun-2009	B763/W	Charles De Gaulle (LFPG)	Miami Intl (KMIA)	04:20 EDT	13:35 EDT	9:15

J. testified: The FAA places a high priority on initiatives to reduce runway incursions, and will continue to implement recommendations that reduce their occurrence. In August 2007, FAA put out a Call to Action to improve runway safety, and we have made significant progress on a number of these initiatives. Since then, there have been five serious runway incursions at the 20 airports, subject to detailed reviews during the first phase of the Call to Action, compared to 13 serious runway incursions in the 17 months prior. The 75 medium and large airports completed painting enhanced markings in advance of the June 2008 deadline, and 292 of the 485 small airports have completed the marking process. Detailed reviews of 42 airports selected on the basis of runway incursion and wrong runway departure risk are complete and have resulted in approximately 200 short-term and 200 mid- and long-term initiatives. Almost all of the short-term initiatives have been completed.

Funny, but the NTSB has a different take on what you call a "high priority" J. The NTSB calls the FAA's response to improving runway safety as an "unacceptable response" on it's list of Most Wanted Aviation Safety Improvements. From the NTSB website:

The FAA held a “Call to Action” on August 15, 2007, where key aviation industry representatives met for 1 day to discuss short- and long-term measures to improve the safety of airport operations. The participants identified the issue of taxi clearances as an area in need of improvement, and the FAA is conducting a review of taxi clearance policies. The FAA has completed a safety risk analysis, is reviewing a resulting safety risk management plan, and is considering what changes, if any, need to be made. Eight years after the Safety Board issued recommendations concerning taxi clearance procedures, and more than a year after the Call to Action meeting, where these issues were identified as critical safety concerns, the FAA has neither taken the actions recommended nor indicated to the Safety Board any plans to do so.

But airports got lines painted, J. says under oath. That's action! Read more of the NTSB's Most Wanted here.

Performance-based navigation is another building block for NextGen which we are accelerating with cooperation from industry. The FAA maximizes the use of airspace, especially in congested areas, through targeted airspace and procedures enhancements. Performance-based navigation includes Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Procedures (RNP), which allow equipped aircraft to fly more direct and precise paths, reducing flight time and fuel use, as well as localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) procedures, which can increase access to airports, especially in low visibility conditions.

If the airspace allocated to Potomac TRACON west of Dulles can be used as an example of targeted airspace and procedures enhancements we'd give the FAA a grade of D minus. Aircraft making their way to IAD and DCA on the new RNAV arrival procedures are routinely vectored off the routes as soon as they enter PCT airspace. (Same goes for the RNAV departure procedure west off of BWI). Why? Because the procedures were designed for a purpose (see J.'s words above) without considering the impact or effect on how air traffic controllers get airplanes from point A to point B. Just more of the "we're in control" mentality of today's FAA.

If J. and his FAA management team truly cared about all of this RNAV stuff then they wouldn't have brought it to us the way it was (here it is, use it, no?, okay) and allowed it to turn in to what it is (planes don't fly more direct or precise paths, flight time is not reduced, neither is fuel use). Makes it seem like the FAA's only concern is that RNAV procedures are published and aircraft FMS equipment can be programmed to fly them. What happens when the plane gets in the air is a whole different story. Easy spin for the FAA: "Controllers have the prerogative to do what they have to do for safety" which translates to "We don't really care what airplanes do as long as we look good to the people that appropriate our budget requests that we turn into contracts for private companies that lobby Congress on our behalf and hire our executives when they retire."

How nice that the airline companies are spending millions on equipment to fly RNAV procedures to "reduce flight time and fuel use" while air traffic controllers don't use the procedures because of their adverse affects on safety and efficiency. Maybe RNAV procedures are working somewhere; but in the FAA Administrator's backyard they're a colossal failure. Buy hey, what does Congress know or care anyway. Just say NextGen and it's golden.

On November 20, 2008, three major new runways opened: at Seattle-Tacoma, Washington Dulles, and Chicago O’Hare International Airports. The Seattle runway is expected to cut local delays in half by increasing capacity in bad weather by 60 percent, while the new runway at Dulles will provide capacity for an additional 100,000 annual operations.

New runway 1L/19R along with the SHNON RNAV arrival procedure doesn't seem to have improved capacity seeing as planes still fly 20 miles or more on the downwind before getting to the capacity improving runway. Maybe the statistics spin a picture other than what controllers see everyday.

And if they're landing on 1L everyone onboard can enjoy the ride to the gate. There aren't any taxiways to get from 1L to the terminal without a taxi-back to the approach end of the runway. Any Dulles controllers that can describe this operation please send us an email. The runway closest to you in the picture is Runway 1L/19R.
On the data breach...

In February 2009, the FAA experienced a large privacy breach, exposing personally identifiable information (PII) from 2006 on over 45,000 employees. As a result the agency had to notify its employees, many of whom had left the agency, and provide credit monitoring protection. It cost the FAA approximately $2 million to manage remediation activities associated with the breach, including notification and protection of its employees. This does not include any potential legal costs that may result from this incident. In FY 2010, the costs associated with acceleration of activities needed to protect FAA information assets from unauthorized disclosure, and prevent loss of privacy sensitive data and other types of PII, are expected to exceed $2 million. The FY 2010 request supports the acceleration of these activities. This will give us the ability to terminate malicious activity in near real time and reduce significant loss of data. We expect to achieve a reduction in privacy incidents to pre-2007 levels.

This is swell. But what exactly are pre-2007 levels? And how far 'pre'? Before 2007 when there was less data and not as many systems vulnerable to compromise? J., you (we) expect to achieve a reduction to pre-2007 levels when the likelihood of system compromise is greater than ever today? And we (us) expected the agency to be a little more careful with the personal data of it's employees. Something as simple as testing new databases with actual employee information OFF-LINE couldn't be done. It's only money though. Oh, it happens everywhere. Sure, but we can only do what Congress funds us for. Yep, plenty of reasons why. Might be a good time to look at existing rules on computer security and follow them rather than look for more money to accomplish something that can be achieved today.

Organizational Excellence
The FY 2010 budget request ensures the success of FAA’s mission through stronger leadership, a better-trained workforce, enhanced cost control measures, and improved decision-making based on reliable data. Working with employees and industry partners, FAA strives to invest in high-performing programs and services. At the same time, it must end those that are redundant or ineffective. Likewise, the agency must minimize costs and use resources wisely while maintaining its focus on customer requirements and aligning its products and services to their needs.

J., actions of your field managers--notably, at Potomac TRACON--speak louder than your words to Congress. Strong leadership does not work to make the job of air traffic controllers more difficult--like at Potomac TRACON. A better-trained workforce will happen when you allow experienced, willing, and motivated controllers to transfer from smaller facilities to the busier ones. Time, money, and energy spent on finding a better and quicker way to get trainees through the program can be saved when you once again, J., allow experienced controllers to move up the ranks without the financial penalty that exists in the short-sighted pay system of today.

This budget request, FAA Reauthorization, a true contract with air traffic controllers (and the other FAA bargaining units without one), and getting control of your new agency by replacing managers that got us to where we are will turn this ship around before it runs aground. And next time around you'll have action to show that the FAA can do something right-- instead of meaningless words. Wouldn't that be nice, J?

FAA Orders New Measures To Combat H1N1.

The H1N1 strain (formerly known as "swine flu") is back in the news as the World Health Organization raised it's alert level from phase 5 to phase 6.  This shouldn't have been out of the news for as long as it has been--a few weeks?  Not to worry though, the FAA has not been asleep at the wheel as you might expect. Here's what the FAA has been doing about it (from the employee's website):

• Coordinated on the National Implementation Plan as a member of the DOT Pandemic Influenza Task Force.
  
• Established a staff-level Crisis Response Working Group.*
• Established a senior executive-level Crisis Response Steering Group for Pandemic Influenza.*

* Led by the Associate Administrator for Aviation Security and Hazardous Materials (ASH).

These groups, which represent all FAA lines of business and staff offices, are responsible for drafting the FAA pandemic flu plan and developing and executing exercises to further refine the plan. Planning considerations include continuity of essential functions and services, protecting employee health, and stakeholder interactions. In particular, AHR is developing a consistent agency approach for gathering information on employee status during a pandemic, as well as consistent and easy ways to provide information to employees. AHR is also developing questions and answers for managers and supervisors about the HR issues that may arise during a pandemic and is creating a plan to establish telephone help desks to assist managers, supervisors, and employees with HR-related questions and issues during a pandemic. An online training course on roles & responsibilities during a pandemic has been developed and is on eLMS: Course 30200206, Pandemic Influenza and You.

And what has the FAA really done in the air traffic control facilities?  Well, we can only speak to Potomac TRACON.  This is another reason why we don't look to FAA management for help.  All of the planning, contingencies, meetings, workgroups, help desks, training courses, is just more spinning their wheels while the virus rages on.  

We have the hand sanitizers mounted on the walls outside of the bathrooms.  Check that off the list.  Does anyone really use those things? 

Now, one week after the World Health Organization's pronouncement, the FAA has swung into action with a notice to employees.  Knowing that a memo placed in the Read & Initial binder wouldn't get the desired results, the FAA management team at Potomac TRACON has gone above and beyond their roles as leaders and protectors.  It's kind of a shock and awe-like way to get the message across to the air traffic controllers at Potomac TRACON.  For real.  This is in all the bathrooms at PCT.



And the FAA actually has made up a poster to promote hand washing.  Take a look.  Cool soap!

And next are the CBI and refresher training videos to drive the point home.

More from the FAA employee's website---Updated: 4:44 pm ET June 12, 2009

How will I know when FAA has activated its flu plan?
FAA will activate its plan upon notification by the Department of Health and Human Services. Although the World Health Organization has not yet declared the 2009 H1N1 flu outbreak a pandemic, portions of the FAA plan have been implemented, such as beginning to install hand sanitizer dispensers at all FAA facilities. The severity of the flu virus determines how much of the plan is implemented. FAA leadership will notify all employees and contractors through every means available: through the management chain of command, broadcast messages, updates on the pandemic flu portion of the employee intranet, and so on.

On June 11,  2009, Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization stated at the very top and again in the body of her announcement: The world is now at the start of the 2009 influenza pandemic.  What world is FAA management in?

J. Under Oath

We're trying.  But it's hard not to be too quick to judge recently interned FAA Administrator J. Randolph "Randy" Babbitt.  His spoken and written words are eerily similar to those from the Blakey/Sturgell regime.  Message to J.- lose the speech writers and write your own stuff.  The words make it sound like you're carrying on the tradition of the past failed Administrators.  Changing the culture of despair depends on your leadership J.  Using the words of Blakey and Sturgell is akin to a wolf in sheep's clothing.  Say it ain't so!

J., in his testimony to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation June 16th, sounded way too much like ex-Adminstrators who have ram-rodded their "run it a like business" prophecy into what is widely accepted as a failure.


March 22, 2007.  Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation former FAA Administator Marion Blakey testified:

"This budget request makes sure that we’ll have the right number of controllers working in the right place at the right time."

March 6, 2008.  Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation former FAA Administator Bobby Sturg-eel testified:

"As with the safety inspector workforce, FAA is aggressively hiring and training controllers to ensure the right number of controllers are in place at the right time to address the well-documented retirement “bubble.”

June 16, 2009.  Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation FAA Administrator J. Randolph Babbitt testified:

"The budget supports this effort so that FAA can continue to ensure that the right number of trained controllers are in the right place at the right time."

J.'s (and his predecessors) get a lot of their 'catch phrase' talking points from the FAA's 10-year controller staffing strategy.  

As part of FAA’s ten-year strategy for the air traffic control workforce, FAA plans to hire 1,702 controllers in FY 2010 for a net increase of 107 controllers. The budget supports this effort so that FAA can continue to ensure that the right number of trained controllers are in the right place at the right time. In the last four years, FAA has hired more than 5,600 new air traffic controllers, ensuring the flexibility to match the number of controllers with traffic volume and workload. As we continue to bring these new employees on board, we must carefully manage the process to ensure that our trainees progress in a timely manner and are hired in the places we need them.

Here are a few more lines that caught our attention...

Safety continues to be our number one priority, with approximately 44 percent of the agency’s FY 2010 budget supporting our mission to safely operate and maintain the air traffic control system, inspect aircraft, certify new equipment, ensure the safety of flight procedures, and oversee the safety of commercial space transportation. Over the past ten years, the commercial accident rate has been reduced by eighty percent. Even with this success, our goal is to proactively identify and work to implement further safety improvements. In our responsibility for safety oversight, we work with stakeholders to establish safety management systems to identify potential areas of risk. Then we work together to address these risk areas.

About a dozen air traffic control/flight procedures that need improvement were identified by PCT NATCA President Brendan Connolly.  'Need improvement' is a subtle (understating) way to say that FAA has put in place procedures at Potomac TRACON that are safety risks for pilots and air traffic controllers.  The Union's list was received by FAA Air Traffic Manager Roderick Harrison several weeks ago and haven't been referred to since.  How will J. reconcile his testimony with what really happens in the field?  Then we work together to address these risk areas, J. says.  J.: Send a memo to Rod.  Get the list out and get to work with the NATCA rep to address these risk areas.  

The FAA Administrator's testimony to Congress doesn't ring true at Potomac TRACON.  For several years, air traffic controllers at PCT have worked around many of these unsafe procedures by employing techniques that don't necessarilty comply with the 7110.65 (that's the Air Traffic Control handbook).  Safety is number one priority to air traffic controllers but the actions by FAA management at PCT make that a hard line to sell.  Maybe Congress buys it (seeing as J.'s words are under oath) but air traffic controllers in field certainly don't.

Our highly trained air traffic controllers play a critical role in achieving the outstanding level of aviation safety we enjoy in the U.S. Looking forward, I am dedicated to maintaining and improving the levels of safety we have achieved thus far while continuing to improve working conditions and expand the diversity of this workforce.

Highly trained?  That's a misnomer.  And seeing as the House has passed legislation that calls for an assessment of training programs for air traffic controllers there must be something amiss.  The FAA's use of computer based instruction (CBI) to keep controllers "highly trained" is a joke.  Same programs done year after year with many that have nothing to do with the TRACON air traffic control.  Refresher briefings meant to keep our "highly trained" air traffic controllers current on seldom used procedures are rush jobs.  Questions are asked of contract trainers that have no answers.  On-the-job training is done the same way as it's been for decades.  Plug in-work the planes as best you can-talk about it when the session is over-write up a training report.  Here's the section from the House bill (HR 915):

    SEC. 609. ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS.

(a) Study- The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
conduct a study to assess the adequacy of training programs for air
traffic controllers.
(b) Contents- The study shall include--
(1) a review of the current training system for air traffic controllers;
(2) an analysis of the competencies required of air traffic controllers for
successful performance in the current air traffic control environment;
(3) an analysis of competencies required of air traffic controllers as the
Federal Aviation Administration transitions to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System; and
(4) an analysis of various training approaches available to satisfy the
controller competencies identified under paragraphs (2) and (3).
(c) Report- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Administrator shall submit to the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the
results of the study.

If this study is done the way today's FAA does anything then we expect that training protocols (such as they are) will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future.  If the study isn't used as a cover to show that everything is a-okay (it's not) then there is hope that some much needed (and long overdue) improvements to controller training will happen. 

We're not sure what J. means when he testifies that he is dedicated to maintaining and improving the levels of safety. A key indicator of safety in the system is operational errors. OEs are at record levels.  At the current rate, 2009 should be a record breaking year for operational errors.  This isn't a level we want to see maintained.  The FAA changed the definition of operational errors in 2008 and are preparing to do it again this year.  These redefining moments, by themselves, don't improve safety.  Read this blog about the FAA and it's bill of goods packaged as a safety plan.      

... while continuing to improve working conditions.

The key word in J.'s line is continuing.  And it should be replaced with starting.  Here we wrote about the FAA's placement on the polling list of best places to work in the federal government (214 out of 216).  Just like safety levels shouldn't be maintained, the FAA needs to start over at improving working conditions.  If 214 out of 216 is a result of the FAA's continuing effort to improve working conditions then it's time to regroup.  Take a look at the people that got us to where we are.  And don't ask them to help to fix it, J.  This is the time to start anew.

By improving our training techniques and using high-fidelity simulators, we have reduced the training period from an average of 3-5 years down to 2-3 years.

And if new hires were not sent to the busiest facilities--like pre-2006 (when the FAA changed the rules and imposed their own contract)--but instead to the lower level facilities to learn their trade and thus allowing the experienced controllers to move up the career ladder you would see that training time drop even more.  And you wouldn't need the high-fidelity simulators either.  But you see, J., this would mean the money used to buy hi-tech training equipment would be spent on paying controllers to move to the busier facility.  If you want experienced controllers getting certified at the busiest facilities quicker then it's time to change the placement process of new hires into these facilities.  There is no shortage of experienced controllers seeking to move up the ladder to the busier facilities. 

As it is implemented, NextGen will enable aircraft to safely fly more closely together on more direct routes, reducing delays, and providing benefits for the environment and the economy through reductions in carbon emissions, fuel consumption, and noise.

No new runways = no reduction in delays = no argument.  It's that simple.

As FAA lays the groundwork for this dramatic transformation, new technology and procedures are already being implemented to provide immediate benefits to operators. An example is the recent flight from Paris to Miami that tested the new space-based signaling system. This test involved the NextGen initiative that focuses on satellite guidance. It also engaged in unrestricted climbs and descents to determine the efficiency of the new procedure. Another test flight will be conducted without any kind of delay to determine the maximum benefit that can be achieved from the tailored arrival concept.

Here's a pre-flight report from PalmBeachPost.com with some views of the Miami NATCA reps.  Hmm, seems the flight didn't go.  From MiamiHerald.com: 

genmisc23 wrote on 06/13/2009 08:13:19 AM: The passengers on this test flight were not advised that they will be part of this experiment. The flight from Paris to Miami was canceled at the last minute. The passengers were offered no explanation of the cancellation, and little acceptable alternatives for a way to return home. The check-in employee at CDG said haughtily that passengers have become spoiled in expecting to get home on time. The best alternative was a flight arriving at JFK at 1:30 PM. The connecting flight to MIA left over two hours late, after 9 PM. Instead of arriving in MIA in mid-afternoon, over 24 hrs. after starting the journey. The delay resulted in additional expenses of $97.00 for food, carts and transportation. AA offered no compensation, no voucher for meals, no nothing, including no apologies. At landing a crew member spoke the usual thank you for flying AA, we know you have a choice when selecting airlines. Do keep this in mind when you choose what airlines to fly the next time.


...there's plenty more of J.'s testimony that we'll write about in our next segment of J. Under Oath.

Here's why.

There hasn't been a lot of talk about the upcoming facility barbecue staged by the PCT NATCA Rep and ATM under the guise of helping a friend (Rep) and celebrating some accomplishment (ATM).  All of this is a load a crap.  Neither one wants it but both are committed to it anyway.  Why? 

Our primary focus is on PCT Air Traffic Manager Roderick Harrison.  He's no different than his predecessor in the lack of concern about air traffic controllers at this facility. It's no secret.  He doesn't know their names, he doesn't know what they do, he doesn't answer their questions straight up, he doesn't provide any semblance of leadership to his immediate staff (which affects subordinates all the way down the line).  Why, after three years of tyranny that has been preached and practiced from the top down, does Rod now find the sense of who-knows-what to throw a barbecue for air traffic controllers that he doesn't even know?

It is of no great coincidence that the FAA placed 214 out of 216 as a best place to work in the federal government.  We wrote about it here.  The Obama Administration is not at all happy with that and will correct it.  To put it succinctly, the FAA sucks because of leaders like Rod.  On June 11th, Office of Management and Budget Director Peter Orzag transmitted a memorandum to agency heads to improve employee satisfaction and wellness.  Here is the memo.  Most of it speaks to the protocol and process for hiring federal employees but the last section says this:

Improving Employee Satisfaction and Wellness

The Federal government should be a model employer. Employee engagement is directly linked to achievement of agency missions.

Agency leaders should strategically use their Federal Human Capital Survey findings and other information to improve recruitment, retention, and results. Each agency, as part of its FY 2011 Budget submission, should include an action plan that it will implement to improve its workplace measures in the specific areas that employees have identified as needing improvement.

The Administration cares about the health of its employees and strongly supports wellness programs at Federal agencies. We ask that you promote health and wellness initiatives in your agencies. Specifically, as part of their FY 2011 Budget submissions, agencies should submit an inventory of their current wellness activities, including cafeteria and fitness facilities, and health clinics as well as any plans to enhance these programs. As examples, plans to: sponsor wellness competitions, open or expand employee fitness facilities, enhance cafeteria and vending machines offerings to promote fruits, vegetables, and heart healthy choices should be submitted. OMB and OPM will use these inventories to compile and promote best practices in Federal employee wellness.

More specific information on these requirements will be communicated shortly.

The Administration's message was transmitted to facility managers to do something, ANYTHING, to improve the morale of air traffic controllers (without admitting that FAA management had anything to do with it getting to the low level that it is).  Rod couldn't even scrape some money together to fix the FAA's own barbecue grill to support this culture change initiative.  Instead asking the NATCA Facility Representative if he could use his grill is just beyond the pale.  Come on Rod.  This is not only a slap in the face of the Union and it's members that you have strived to marginalize but it makes you look like an ass for changing your tune at the snap of someone else's fingers.  Of course that's what you do Rod-- do as you're told--but my God, couldn't you have stalled and delayed this like you do everything else?  Not only have you given the controllers and supervisors and managers--probably the janitor's too--and anyone else that's in tune to what goes on around here another reason to laugh at you behind your back after reading your dumb-ass memo that was supposed to be an invitation but this just makes the agency--and you--look foolish and two-faced.  Just scrap the whole barbecue thing for now.  Revisit it when the contract is forced down your throat in a month or two.  Nothing will change between now and then anyway. 

We'd like to think it was a smooth move to commandeer the Union's grill for your PR purposes, Rod, but it was more like dumb luck.  Your luck and the union rep's.....well, dumb, offer to trade Nanci Castellano for the use the barbecue.  Here's the Union rep's letter to the membership explaining why he agreed to do what he did.  Explanation

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Try as he may, the explanation doesn't hold water.  If you're no friend of management and NOBODY is more sensitive to the injustices we have suffered from for the last three years then this sure is an odd way of demonstrating it. 

And what of the position this Union is now in?  The FAA knows the PCT Local has thousands of dollars in it's bank account.  And the FAA now knows that we can be bought if it's something we (more like, the Union rep) wants bad enough.  What's next?  NATCA Rep wants to change some procedure or move some scopes or get a member transferred to another facility.  FAA ATM wants a new TV for the cafeteria or some better chairs for his office, or maybe NATCA will even buy some parts to repair the FAA's grill--and install them too!  Why not?  Anything goes.  It's not negotiating.  It's cutting a deal.  No big deal?  Wait and see when either 'side' needs/wants something.

Both Rod and Brendan have time, opportunity, and good reason to cancel the June 27th barbecue that is a charade for both of them getting something over on the other at the expense of everyone else.  We hope that good sense will prevail.
  

Party On Rod!

We found this letter tucked inside one of the General Information binders in the TRACON.  A rather sterile callous sounding piece in this "announcement" for the big facility BAR BQ (that's barbecue.)  You'd think that if Rod and Co. really wanted to have a celebration that he'd put some effort into a nice colorful flyer and post it around the facility.  But no.  Seeing as he and many other FAA managers around the country have been told to fix the morale issues any way they can this is the best Rod can come up with.
TradeYa

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Yes, you read what you thought you read.  Three years of blood, sweat, and tears all for this.  And you thought the union rep was going to tell Rod to pound sand and go get his own barbecue.  'fraid not.

Gotta love this "announcement", or GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN.  I suppose we can say "they" instead of "he" as we write about this GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN seeing as Rod and Brendan, the union rep, both signed it.  A little side note before we get into this. 

CORRECTION:  On the last blog we made a small mistake.  Rod did ask to use NATCA's barbecue but a source tells us that it was the union rep, not Rod, who threw out the offer to transfer ***** out of the James River Area for the use of the barbecue.  We regret the error.

This is such a sham.  They want to express the overall thanks for the great job we do?  Right.  Sorry we can't return the favor back to management.  The FAA ranks 214 out of 216 of great places to work in the federal government because of management policies practiced at Potomac TRACON by Rod, Steve, Brian, and every other one of their ilk that works behind the glass doors. 

And what exactly is the accomplishment?  The accomplishment is the great  job we do? WTF is that supposed to mean?   Can anyone NOT see through the patronization of this GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN?  Let's throw a party!  Have some eats (no drinks though). It'll be a blast.  Nevermind that this management team does everything they can to make our job as difficult as possible.  Do they really believe that air traffic controllers who have persevered through the past three years of the FAA taking control, being in control, and wrecking all that they touched will just wolf down a burger and pretend that it's all over?  The answer is yes.

There are many controllers--NATCA controllers--that will line up to get their burger and be used as a tool of the FAA.  NATCA controllers about to be used in the FAA's public relations campaign to repair their image after three years of failures of running air traffic control as a business.  Failures created by forcing work and pay rules on it's air traffic controllers that have wrought havoc on this profession.  And even still, there are those NATCA controllers that think it's no big deal to just grab a burger from the employer that is to blame for the state of this profession.  Don't let them off the hook this easy.  Don't eat their food and trade it for your integrity.  We are better than this.

We know that Rod didn't really want to do this barbecue thing.  He was told to do it.  And since he wouldn't go that extra inch to advertize it beyond putting a memo in a binder here's something from TPCAU.  A color flyer.  Download it.  Print it.  Post it.  Just don't eat the food next Saturday.
Bloodburger Flyer

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