NextGen this.

Don't think it's gone unnoticed.  The NextGen tag is being affixed to nearly everything the FAA brass is talking and writing about.  Congressional testimony-- NextGen.  FAA press release--NextGen.  Policy changes--NextGen.  Rearrange deck chairs--NextGen.     

January 22, 2010 —NEXTOR Researchers Provide NextGen Decision Data
January 27, 2010 — A resource guide intended to improve the safety culture during the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System is getting an update with input from FAA employees.
February 1, 2010—   FAA Responds to NextGen Task Force Recommendations
February 3, 2010—ATO Safety Retools for NextGen

....there's plenty more where that came from.   

Air traffic controllers know as well as anyone that the tools of our trade are in need of upgrading.  Radar, radios, telephones, information displays--all of it--has outlived its usefulness.  It's not state of the art any longer.  Who are we--as employees--to say how much it should cost and who should make the new NextGen stuff?  And what NextGen stuff should air traffic controllers have to do their jobs better and safer?  Oh, not to worry.  There are plenty of companies with their people lining up at the NextGen cash trough that know what we need.  Whether it makes our jobs any easier or flying any safer will be known after they get their$.   

It's not easy to keep an eye on the government machinations churning out contracts to make NextGen into something tangible.  The outlay for NextGen is all over the place, from a cool $4.6 Billion in 2007 to somewhere in the neighborhood, by some accounts, of $70 Billion today.  At those figures air traffic controllers are going to have some major cool kick-ass equipment to work with when all is said and done. 

And with major cash outlays like this the FAA is ramping up its internal business operations to maintain proper oversight and to show what good stewards of the taxpayer's dollars this federal agency can be.  History cannot be allowed to repeat itself.  Like what happened with the Advanced Automation System.  More on that here, and here too, and here.  Enough history.  Besides, no one wants to look backwards.  As existing offices change their focus to the support of NextGen--most recently the Office of Safety--and new offices created--in 2003 Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to plan and coordinate the development of NextGen--there's a lot to look forward to. 

Still, it seems, the FAA needs more support to keep NextGen on track.  A Federal advisory committee to the FAA, known as RTCA--an acronym for Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics--created a NextGen Task Force.  This group--whose members are from government and industry, with a smattering of labor (one representative from NATCA) --met several times during 2009 to come up with a near-term set of priorities for NextGen.  A final report from the task force was published on September 9, 2009. 

Randy Babbitt, while working for the Oliver Wyman consulting firm, served as the first chairman of the NextGen TaskForce.  He stepped down upon receiving the news of his nomination to be FAA Administrator. 

On October 28, 2009, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a hearing to review the RTCA recommendations.  There's a video of the hearing too.  The FAA, in color brochure fashion responded to the RTCA report in January agreeing with every recommendation.  Read it here. 

The FAA is trying really hard to get NextGen done right.  Almost too hard.  It's makes us a little suspect with the overuse of the NextGen trademark.  We can only hope this doesn't turn out to be business as usual.    

In part two we'll look at the FAA's response to the RTCA recommendations.  In color.

Double down.

Let there be no doubt that double standards exist between air traffic controllers and their supervisors in what is acceptable performance in plying the trade of air traffic control.  This double standard is easy to apply because the ones applying it are the supervisors.  Complicating things--or, rather, making it all possible--is the convenient fact that no one evaluates the supervisor's performance when they pretend to ply the trade during their eight hours per month of s0-called "proficiency" time.

Air traffic controllers have all sorts of rules and regulations that they absolutely must follow--and rightly so.  Chapter upon section upon paragraph serve the dual purpose of ensuring safety in the skies and accountability by the air traffic controller to do their job to the best of their ability.  And, for certain, there will be a Front Line Manager (better known as a supervisor in the real world) on hand to keep an eye on that air traffic controller, making sure that he or she is doing what they're supposed to be doing.

Wouldn't you expect that supervisors who are holding their subordinates accountable for doing the job correctly practice what they preach?  Put another way, if the FAA brass wants to have leaders instead of managers then how will it ever be if these wanna-be leaders are not people that air traffic controllers would ever EVER respect or look to for guidance?  These faux leaders plug in to work a radar sector, do a terrible job which requires others to bail them out of jams (i.e. their control instructions cause airplanes to run all over each other), then laugh and make jokes about it with their subordinates after the dust has settled.   

Here are two examples of air traffic control workmanship (poorly) demonstrated by a supervisor.  Any air traffic controller would first be ashamed and embarrassed to work like this, and second, would be written up or counseled (probably both) for poor performance by the same supervisor. 

On January 26, 2010, around 1pm on the southbound departure sector out of Potomac TRACON airspace Delta 1885 and Southwest 337 were close in trail after departing Baltimore.  After making the first left turn SWA337 started to gain on Delta 1885.  Another 20 or 30 miles along the way both of the airplanes leveled off at 23,000 feet while the controller at Washington Center waited and wondered when and if the two airplanes would ever get more than five miles apart (that is minimum separation for enroute aircraft--which is what they would have been had this supervisor got 'em separated many miles back.)  Instead, what did she do?  Gave a call for the Southwest crew to look for the Delta MD-80.  "Got 'em in sight" says Southwest.  Great!  "Southwest 337 maintain visual separation from the 737", says the supervisor. 

One problem.  Well really there are several.  First off is this rule from the air traffic control handbook.
7-2-1. VISUAL SEPARATION

a. TERMINAL. Visual separation may be applied between aircraft under the control of the same facility within the terminal area up to but not including FL 180

We thought everyone knew this rule.  Guess not.  Don't apply visual separation between aircraft above 18,000 feet.  There is not a more basic air traffic control rule than this one.  The PCT Safety Assurance office (there's a misnomer if ever there was one) was tipped off about it with a suggestion that this little event may be good content for a reminder memo to the troops.  Don't do as we say, do as we tell you kind of a thing. 

Safety Assurance manager Mike Hawrysko must have thought controllers know better than to get two airplanes so close to each other at 23,000 feet that the only way out would be to (incorrectly) apply visual separation.  After all, air traffic controllers are the ones held accountable for following the rules; not supervisors.  The memo didn't come.  Big surprise.

This event was seconds away from being an operational error.  If the Washington Center controller would have taken the handoff on either Southwest 337 or Delta 1885 just after the supervisor playing controller established (illegal) visual separation she would have told Southwest or Delta to "contact Washington Center" on the appropriate radio frequency.  As soon as the aircraft checked on the Washington Center frequency is when this misapplication of a rule would have been an operational error.  Of course, that's assuming the two airplanes were less than five miles apart.  Why would she have tried to get visual if they were already separated?  It's a good thing the Washington Center controller had the good sense to not take the handoff on either airplane until they were separated (correctly.)

On January 31, 2010, around 3:30pm, on the Potomac TRACON west arrival feeder sector for Washington-National Airport this same supervisor (who apparently doesn't know when and where not to be) is in position for another shoddy display of air traffic control that would have landed a real air traffic controller in the tape room, a Quality Assurance Review entry in the facility operations log, a paragraph or so in their Technical Training Discussion, and probably a trip to the training department to be re-taught how you're supposed to give instructions to pilots so that their airplanes follow the preceding at like intervals descending to the same altitude at matched speeds as they're handed off to the next sector.  

Here's the arrival procedure that nearly every DCA arrival from the west uses.  Refer to it as you listen to 10 minutes of horrendous air traffic control.  (Sorry it's not the best quality recording.)  The uninitiated may think this sounds just like another busy air traffic controller.  It's not.  Here are a few cues that things are going badly:  Every aircraft is vectored off of the arrival procedure, repeat instructions to the same aircraft, aircraft not answering, blocked transmissions, ending transmissions with 'please', starting transmissions with 'as soon as practical', stacking aircraft at 8,000 and 9,000 (AAL810, COM455) at ELDEE.  Eight airplanes in 12 minutes.  That's all!  How pathetic it is that she made a plan that ends up with airplanes being stacked at ELDEE at 8 and 9 TWICE.   

Let us review a few of the rules that apply to air traffic controllers and their job performance.  These rules are specifically aimed at air traffic controllers, even though supervisors work a limited number of hours 'on the boards' these rules don't apply to them. 

These are the rules of double standards.  Think about it--like air traffic controllers do all the time.  Supervisors, just like the one described in today's blog, are the enforcers.  It's funny to read some of these rules while thinking about this supervisor that can't work (very well) eight airplanes in 12 minutes or resort to visual separation to get two airplanes apart at 23,000 feet. 

HROI - Procedures For Addressing Unacceptable Performance
Supervisors are responsible for addressing unacceptable performance. However, signs of deficient performance generally surface long before performance actually falls to an unacceptable level. Supervisors should intervene at the first signs of deficient performance.

Who addresses the supervisor's unacceptable performance?  Safety Assurance Manager?  Operations Manager?  Anyone?  No one?  Pretty much.


FAA Order 7210.56C Air Traffic Quality Assurance 
2-1-1. OVERVIEW
A critical component of any effective quality assurance program is problem prevention.

2-1-2. RESPONSIBILITIES
(7) Ensure that regional/facility OE/OD prevention plans provide the means for identification of non-compliance with national, regional, and local facility directives or standards; identify the cause(s) of the noncompliance; immediately rectify occurrences of noncompliance; and eliminate future non-compliance.

3-1-1. OVERVIEW
To provide for the continuous enhancement of technical proficiency and correction of any performance deficiencies in the air traffic workforce, individualized training requirements for technical performance must be identified and accomplished.

3-1-2. DEFINITIONS
a. Proficiency: Knowing, understanding, and applying air traffic procedures in a safe and efficient manner.
b. Performance: The act of operating in a proficient manner.

4-1-3. QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW (QAR)
For the ATC system to be effective, it is essential that all system deficiencies be identified and corrected. Serious system deficiencies may be involved in air traffic incidents that fall outside of the definitions and corrective procedures for OE/ODs. QARs provide an opportunity for the identification, investigation, and resolution through corrective training of these identified deficiencies.

a. Conduct a QAR for all of the following when air traffic control services are involved:
(6) Public inquiries regarding air traffic control services provided during a specific operation; e.g. flight crewmember, passenger, or media inquiries.

Double standards will exist in this profession as long as FAA managers promote incompetence and don't hold their supervisors accountable to a higher standard than their subordinate employees.  What will you say when your performance is questioned?  Oh, we laughed about yours why can't we do the same with mine?  Let's start with the quality assurance order......

It's not a laughing matter anymore, that you can be assured of. And even though some controllers will laugh along with the supervisor trying to make light of herself trying oh so hard to be like a real air traffic controller they'll be the first to ridicule her when she turns her back.  But it won't change a thing. 

Administrator will visit TRACON.

We thought our readers at PCT would like to know that FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt will visit the TRACON on Friday, February 12, 2010.  We heard it from some guy working on the TV in the breakroom and confirmed by one of our readers.

We're not sure why the air traffic manager hasn't made an announcement.  So typical of the disrespect TRACON managers have for the workers. 

Now you know.  And when more information on the Administrator's visit comes our way we'll get it to you. 

Thanks (for nothing) to Rod and Steve and the rest of the BTGD crew for keeping the workforce informed.  Maybe you all don't think the Administrator's visit is important-- we do.    

Charles Keegan, Defendant.

Courthouse News Service reports:

Raytheon Rigged FAA Bid, Rival Claims

By BARBARA LEONARD
WASHINGTON (CN) - A high-ranking official at the Federal Aviation Administration conspired with her boyfriend to ensure that his employer, Raytheon, won a billion-dollar contract to train the nation's air traffic controllers, according to a complaint in Superior Court. The Washington Consulting Group claims it was unfairly ousted from the competitive bid, which it had held since 1986.
     Charles Keegan, who left a high-level position with the FAA to work as a project manager at Raytheon Technical Services in 2006, used an "unfair competitive advantage" to win the contract, according to the complaint.
     Washington Consulting claims Keegan was having "a romantic affair" with another FAA official, Maureen Knopes-Keegan, whom he married in August 2007.
     Washington Consulting claims the two hatched a scheme to discourage other companies from bidding on the lucrative contract, though Washington Consulting Group claims its trainers have shaped the U.S. air traffic control system into "the safest in the world."
     In 2006 the FAA announced it was changing how it outsources training for its air traffic controllers, according to the complaint.
     Previously, the FAA hired controllers and sent them out for training. The new plan called for the contractor to recruit, hire and train the controllers, Washington Consulting says.
     The proposed system "dramatically limited the pool of prospective contractors, and completely eliminated WCG," according to the complaint.
     To qualify for the contract, Washington Consulting teamed up with Lockheed Martin, a giant systems integrator. But in 2007 the FAA abandoned the new plan, and the plaintiff says it was at a disadvantage when bidding opened.
     Locked in "the much less lucrative position" of subcontractor, Washington Consulting says it could not enter its own bid and could not contest the FAA's decision, which awarded the contract to "a less qualified and more expensive bidder like Raytheon."
     The FAA's abandoned pretense at overhauling the system was a calculated move and "not the fault of a bureaucratic mistake, incompetence, or change in policy," the complaint states.
     Though the FAA's previous contract terms lasted fewer than 5 years, Raytheon was awarded a 10-year contract, according to the complaint.
     Washington Consulting claims the defendants' meddling has "undermined the safe and efficient training of air traffic controllers that will serve the FAA in years to come."
     Six months into Raytheon's contract, the "behemoth" requested additional funding because it had exhausted the money allocated for the first year of the contract - about $70 million - Washington Consulting claims.
     Raytheon's "insidious" misconduct constitutes a criminal conflict of interest, waste of federal resources and unfair bidding procedures, according to the complaint.
     Washington Consulting seeks punitive damages and lost profits - which it estimates in the hundreds of millions of dollars. It alleges tortious interference with economic advantage, unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets. Its lead attorney is Steven Thomas with Thomas, Alexander & Forrester.

Bid Rig

Regional Jet Disappears From Radar Near U.S. Capitol.

On January 25, 2010, about 11:30am, a Canadair Regional Jet CRJ2 bound for Washington-National Airport narrowly avoided flying through the prohibited area surrounding the nation's capital.  The graphic to the left (courtesy of FlightAware.com) depicts the route of the aircraft as a orange line.  As it flew over the DCA radar site the aircraft became invisible to air traffic controllers at Potomac TRACON.  This is a normal phenomenon known to us as "flying over the main bang." 

As you can see, (following the orange from the bottom of the graphic) the Regional Jet flew from south of DCA to approximately 3/4 of a mile east of DCA (within the "main bang" no radar coverage zone) making a turn to the right and missing P-56 by 3/4 of a mile.  P-56 extends from the ground up to 18,000 feet.  The Regional Jet was at 10,000 feet during this maneuver. 

In the grand scheme of things this event isn't a major shocker to air traffic controllers.  However, it is another of the many problems that we often write about--RNAV flight procedures increasing the workload of air traffic controllers and compromising safety.

The air traffic controller at the Washington-National arrival sector was working several airplanes when this event occurred.  All of the airplanes were on RNAV arrival procedures (so the controller thought) allowing them to fly along the published route with the controller issuing speed and altitude assignments when appropriate.  All indicators were that the soon-to-be invisible aircraft would fly the route like all the others.  A controller working a different sector noticed the Regional Jet not turning left where it should have (south of DCA) and called out to alert the arrival sector controller.  It was almost too late.

Just as the Regional Jet was entering the "main bang" the controller urgently directed the pilot to turn right to avoid entering P-56.  It was a matter of waiting and hoping that the Regional Jet would avoid entering the prohibited area.  Luck prevailed this time when the radar target re-appeared east of P-56.  (Luck is involved in many aspects of air traffic control lately.)

TRACON supervisors, after talking with the pilot on the telephone, determined that the aircraft was NOT on an RNAV arrival procedure.  (The aircraft was flying a non-RNAV procedure that mirrors the route of the RNAV procedure.)  Even though the flight progress strip and the radar data block indicated to the controller that it WAS on an RNAV arrival procedure.  So now what?  The problem doesn't simply vanish.  It's happened before, it'll happen again. 

TRACON management has received many reports--just like this one--of aircraft appearing to the controller to be on an RNAV arrival procedure when they really aren't.  They've had plenty of warnings to correct it before something serious happens.  The January 25th event is just a little bit closer to being newsworthy.  It is amazing that FAA management--even as the change to a 'safety culture' is touted--has to be prodded into addressing safety issues raised by air traffic controllers and their union representatives.  How can FAA management pretend to not understand that when airplanes don't go where an air traffic controller expects them to go it's a problem? 

Sometimes they'll turn into another airplane, sometimes they'll turn toward the White House.  It seems that FAA management, especially the Potomac TRACON team, is okay with air traffic control being a guessing game or game of chance.  Which of the next 25 airplanes is going to fly straight-ahead instead of turn left?  This is what FAA management has turned air traffic control into.  And if the controller doesn't catch it before it's too late?  Then it's time to review the controller's performance. 

The ball is in management's court.  They can pass the buck, they can keep their heads in the sand.  And when the safety problems they know about result in front-page news they'll have a harder time explaining WHY than they would by correcting the problem NOW. 

A frightening assurance.

Potomac TRACON management--under increased scrutiny since the Trooper 2 crash, and all--is re-writing the air traffic control handbook with an advisory to air traffic controllers suggesting that the separation standard between certain VFR aircraft and certain IFR aircraft in the Class B airspace is inadequate.  The existing requirement calls for air traffic controllers to keep 500 feet between VFR and IFR aircraft within the Class B airspace.

The letter below, signed by the Potomac TRACON air traffic manager but written by a traffic-dodging cubicle-dwelling management-sympathizing staff specialist in concert with the rest of the quality assurance staff which works so keenly together in their zealous, jealous, acrimonious quest to show they know better--'cept for the part that the only talkin' to airplanes part of their job comes when they look up in the sky to observe the contrails in the Northern Virginia sky and say "oooh, that's pretty"--than the controller forced into working around this and most other "clarifying memos" that really demonstrate the incompetence of these people who serve no other purpose than to collect a paycheck for doing as little as possible to increase their workload, that is unless it increases the workloads of air traffic controllers, but in the end getting the appreciation from their bosses for a job well done when in reality it wasn't and these specialists end up having to fix what shouldn't have been broken to begin with if only they would have ran it by the real workers who plug in their headsets and talk to pilots and not planes in the sky who have nothing to gain from getting 'it' right other than ensuring safety.  
BTCAS

Before we get into fact checking let's first send out this reminder, as we've done before, that a memorandum is not the correct method for directing work. Order 1320.1E, FAA Directives Management is the national policy and means for issuing policy and procedures withing the FAA.

A memo like this is the lazy mans way to get controllers to do something (we won't) without following agency rules (Order 1320.1E) and also avoids the oversight of a higher authority that changing separation standards naturally should require.

Key sections from the FAA Directives System

6. Function of Directives. Directives are the primary means within the FAA to issue, establish, and describe agency policies, organization, responsibilities, and procedures.

7. Types of Directives.
a. Orders
b. Notices
c. Changes
d. Supplements

Read the complete FAA Order 1320.1E here.

To further illustrate our point--which certainly falls on deaf ears--the very same order (7110.65 Air Traffic Control) that our staff on crack tries to change through interpretive missives says this:

1-1-10. CONSTRAINTS GOVERNING SUPPLEMENTS AND PROCEDURAL DEVIATIONS
a. Exceptional or unusual requirements may dictate procedural deviations or supplementary procedures to this order. Prior to implementing supplemental or any procedural deviation that alters the level, quality, or degree of service, obtain prior approval from the Vice President, System Operations Services.

There is no way prior approval was obtained from Kalinowski on this memo that fits the above section to a Tee.  The only loophole that could have been relied upon by the QA crew to avoid doing this right is that it really hasn't been implemented since most controllers haven't read the binder and others who have aren't going to comply.  Even the sups.  Want compliance Rod?  Get your QA crew to do their homework before preparing an essay (grade = D minus), stop the BS, dust off their headsets and have 'em come on down to the control room and plug in to see why asinine is ignored.

Oh, and don't forget about the facility Standard Operating Procedures (that's a directive) which says, in part, ...(controllers) shall be familiar with and adhere to the information and procedures described in this chapter to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic...  Stee-rike Three!  The memo directs controllers to deviate from the SOP.  Not doin' it! 

Fact checking time.   

TCAS uses range-based calculations (distance and altitude)--not time based calculations.  The range of projection--or 'protection bubble'--is not based on the speed or trajectory of either aircraft. Rather, the algorithms that trigger a Resolution Advisory (RA) is partly determined by speed and trajectory but primarily by proximity.  TCAS RAs command the pilot--or autopilot--to do one of three things: climb, descend, or maintain altitude.  TCAS does not command a pilot/autopilot to steer (as in turn left or right) the airplane in response to a RA.    

What is so challenging about an aircraft flying in circles for hours at the same altitude?  Nothing at all.  Controllers make a decision to either keep IFR aircraft 500 above or 500 below the VFR aircraft.  Not a big deal.  But then, the memo writer doesn't plug in and work airplanes.  We do. 

Not confirmed, but reportedly a quote from the Chief Pilot of US Airways.  Washington is more frightening than any other place we fly?  Oh yeah, it's so hard to turn left when airborne off Runway 1.  Come on now.  Washington really is no different than any other locale for air carriers.  Controllers tell you to turn left, turn right, climb and descend. just like any other place.  And if you're worried about a TCAS RA causing you to deviate laterally into P56 (that's where the White House is) then--wait a minute, the Chief Pilot of US Airways could not have said any of this.  He certainly knows as well as we do that TCAS doesn't command the aircraft to turn left or right in response to an RA.  And, with the exception of the pilot nav departure off Runway 1 there is no route that gets anywhere near P56.  All US Airways planes are on RNAV routes into DCA so the likelihood of crossing into P56 is next to nil.  Hope this Chief Pilot doesn't fly often.  Frightening?  Oh brother.

Paragraph 7-9-4 of Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, specify the separation between VFR aircraft and IFR turbo-jet aircraft in Class B airspace: 500 feet, 1-1/2 miles, visual.  Nowhere is it written in the Order (or anywhere other than this nonsensical memo) When working traffic near VFR operations AND operational considerations allow it, use more than 500 feet separation. That line is in it's own right as the most ridiculous line out of the whole memo.  The purpose of this briefing item....   Doesn't matter.  Air traffic controllers rely on rules that are properly established and written in official directives--which the above memo ain't. 

What's really funny about this is that when a concerned controller asked the memo writer a few questions he got a wee bit defensive.  Understandable.  That's not the funny thing.  Our concerned controller asked the safety and quality assurance writer to look into putting out a memo reminding air traffic controllers that it's not permissible to use visual separation between aircraft above 18,000 feet. (Reference FAA Order 7110.65, paragraph 7-2-1 a.)  After all, when a supervisor (we wrote about her earlier this month here) getting her precious pro-time on a not-so-busy departure sector uses visual separation between two jets at 23,000 feet there's no telling how her subordinates are violating the rulebook.  His reply:  "Call the hotline."  Now that's an assurance of safety!  

A new tool in the war on general aviation.

 A new tool is about to be unleashed in the FAA's global war on general aviation.  Starting Monday, February 8, 2010, the FAA will begin the use of what is known as a Security Notice--abbreviated SECNOT--to apprehend the errant pilot who violates the DC Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA), formerly known as the DC ADIZ. 

The DC ADIZ/SFRA was created in 2003 to restrict the movement and identify aircraft within a 30 mile radius of Washington, DC.  Seven years later the FAA has figured out there is  no way to nab the pilot who violates the SFRA and tries to get away with it.  The long arm of the law is about to get a little longer.  You may outrun the Coast Guard helicopter but you WILL NOT outrun the radio signal of FAA air traffic controllers.  Never!

Here's the Notice from the FAA describing how we're going to get these bad boys.  
N7210.729

In typical fashion, TRACON management simply put the Notice into a binder for controllers to read.  Any questions?  Who are we supposed to ask?  If FAA management places matters of national security (like the SECNOT) in the same category as closing the parking lot for snow removal (memo on that is in the same binder) then it should come as no surprise that most controllers could care less about a Security Notice.  Like most rule changes, we'll figure it out ourselves when we need to. 

These managers have some seriously messed up priorities.  Briefing controllers on the mids (yesterday's blog) is much more important than this security measure.  REALLY!?  Do you really think TRACON managers care about what the FAA--the other FAA that actually does the work--is trying to do to make it seem like we're running this business like a government agency trying to act like a police operation?

If this SECNOT is so important, get someone to Potomac TRACON who can give a detailed briefing to air traffic controllers, with background information, and has the knowledge to answer the obvious questions the Notice raises.  Want to get serious about aviation security Kalinowski?  You can do better than this.

Digging.

We we're going to call this blog "Tone Deaf" after two members of a FAA/NATCA workgroup briefed Potomac TRACON controllers a couple weeks ago on new break rotation rules while working the mid shifts.  Since then the PCT air traffic manager put out a memo that changed what was briefed and added a new twist to what we were going to blog about.

What is it with this management team and mids?  Instead of fixing the numerous unsafe ATC procedures that are causing pilot and operational deviations these people would rather get off by jerking around controllers by changing break rules on the mid shift.  All of this started soon after the NTSB began investigating the crash of Trooper 2 on September 28, 2008.  During the course of the investigation it was disclosed that controllers working the mid shift generally follow a rotation schedule where both controllers work a radar scope until the workload decreases to a level that one controller can handle it.  Around 11pm or so.  The other controller heads off to the break room and returns to relieve the other controller at 2:30am.  At 5:45am the day shift controller arrives and the mid shift is over.  For the most part, mids are uneventful, calm, and a respite from the previous two swing/two day shifts.  Just like at many, many other 24-hour air traffic control facilities. 

FAA managers--the ones who don't work the mids--would like everyone to believe that they have no idea what goes on from 10pm to 6am in the control room.  Why should they?  There's nothing that makes the mid shift any different than a day or swing shift in their world.  So when managers read the NTSB report that controllers were, in the words of the investigator, "splitting the shift" they were shocked and dismayed.  Unbelievable!  "How in the world could this be going on right under our noses?  This must come to an end immediately."  And two months later the air traffic manager tried--and once again was thwarted by his own Front Line Managers. 

For some time now there has been an unwritten policy called '70% productivity' used by Front Line Managers at the direction of the air traffic manager.  The policy was concocted to give the impression that the FAA was running air traffic control operations like a business.  We've heard reports of managers at many air traffic control facilities across the land employing similar measures of keeping controllers on position regardless of workload (i.e. no traffic in the foreseeable future = keep the position staffed anyway.)  It's not like FAA managers care about their own rules.  To prove that point, the policy runs counter to the FAA's own published rule in its Facility Operations and Administration order:

2-6-5. CONSOLIDATING POSITIONS

a. Assign personnel to positions as required by activity, equipment, and facility function. Positions may be consolidated in consideration of activity and the qualifications of the personnel involved.

The policy (as opposed to the above rule) has nothing to do with anything other than FAA managers showing they are (trying to be) in control of the workers.  If anyone thinks that the productivity of air traffic controllers can be measured by time then they are doing way too much crack.  If the thinking is that aviation safety is increased or efficiencies are gained just because every air traffic controller sits at a radar scope for 70% of an eight hour shift, or five hours and 36 minutes, or any other indeterminate number of minutes then delusion is setting in.  It is policies like this that make it impossible for employees to trust their employer.  (Note to Administrator:  This would be a great employee morale booster if you would direct your facility managers to rescind IN WRITING these policies and have them adhere to Order 7210.3, Consolidating Positions.) 

In May, 2009, the air traffic manager sought to address the shocking revelations garnered from reading the NTSB reports four months earlier by putting the 70% productivity policy to paper.  Putting it mildly, it wasn't received well.  Controllers were self-briefed on the 'policy' by reading it in a binder.  Front Line Managers weren't told about it at all.  Controllers asked FLMs about certain aspects of the policy, they didn't have answers.  Quite typical of how information is communicated from the top down at Potomac TRACON, Inc.  Some business this is. 

The reason the 70% productivity policy was put into words was to stop the practice where two controllers on the mid would split the shift.  Still a common practice at many 24-hour air traffic control facilities nationwide.  Even at Potomac TRACON.  Even with the 70% productivity policy in writing.  Well, it was only a memorandum; not really an official directive like would normally be used by a federal agency (business) to direct work.  That was all the FLMs who work the mids needed to justify their actions to thwart what the air traffic manager was trying to do.  They just love pretending to support agency initiatives.

Something backfired though.  The mid FLMs thought it would be cool to keep playing nice with controllers on the mids--like they do during the other 16 hours of the day by badmouthing and generally disrespecting the air traffic manager, his co-managers, and whatever lame-brained memos they put out without even taking the small effort to brief them about it beforehand--by allowing them to keep their same routine on the mid shift and place the controllers on the computerized break rotation/position tracker onto a work position when they really were on a break instead.  It was the best of all worlds.  Controllers were happy (no change in routine on the mids), FLMs were happy (dissing the ATM, keeping controllers happy), and the ATM was happy (his policy was being followed to the letter according to the paperwork.)

It didn't take long for a few people to blow the whistle on what was going on.  Some blew a little louder than others.  Normally, TRACON management would ignore this kind of stuff.  One of these managers must have a sixth sense because it didn't take long for them to launch an investigation--of their own.  To no surprise the mock-investigators discovered no wrong doing.  No forgery of position logs.  No abandonment of work positions.  No coercion or intimidation of employees.  Nothing to see here, just move along.  Yeah,,,, guess it would make it a little awkward to recruit new blood into FAAMA if your grilling the same people you're trying to sign up. 

Still, one FAA manager had a gnawing feeling on his integrity nerve that something wasn't quite right.  Even though the FLMs and controllers answered the pointed questions as anticipated there was something that didn't add up.  But there was no point in trying to squeeze blood from a turnip.  Besides that, managers aren't really investigators and they're not about to call the real ones in that could get to the truth of the matter.  Hmmmm, what to do?  Of course!  We'll get the union to provide us the cover we need to keep the lid from blowing off this operation. 

A few months later a workgroup was formed with a few FLMs and a few controllers--picked by the facility NATCA president--to come up with a way to rotate positions and assign breaks on the midnight shifts.  Or to put it another way, let's dig this hole that we can't get out of a little deeper.

Late September, 2009, the "workgroup" met and in a matter of a few hours they crafted up a plan to fix the problem of....  What?  If everything is so hunky-dory on the mid then why get a workgroup together to figure out some other way to assign controllers to work positions and break?  How hard is this?  REALLY!?

A few weeks later the "workgroup" "leaders" presented their recommendations to the PCT ATM and NATCA President for their concurrence.  We don't know what was concurred to because the work of the group hasn't been made known to the people it affects--controllers and FLMs.  What kind of business is this again?  (See above photo.)

Finally, the first briefing on how mids are going to be worked was held on January 10, 2010.  It was an odd sight to see a fellow controller and former NATCA president briefing his peers on the subject of management rights--an assignment of work.  If this is what the Administrator meant by improving morale through collaboration and engagement with employees then why don't we take back the leave bidding and schedule preparation while we're at it.  And the training department.  The procedures office too.

The briefing was pretty straightforward.  Two radar scopes open 'til midnight, and again from 5am to 6am.  From midnight to 5am do as you please.  But, don't work longer than two hours at a time.  You can bring electronic devices in--like laptops, DVD players--if they're used discreetly.  Ok, fine.  Uh, no, wait a second.  Not fine.

There's more.  Here's a few things thrown out during the briefing for the crowd to digest:

"There may be sups that don't like this and may do something different." 
Which sounds about right because FLMs weren't given the same--or any other--briefing on this "rule change." 

"Oh, and it's only an informal agreement, not in writing." 
Wonder why?  The Secretary of Transportation probably wouldn't be too pleased to read about this.  You know, since he's been traveling all around the country to bring awareness to the problem of distracted drivers who play with their cellphones while driving and crash into other people and kill them.  And after the big deal that was made of the NWA188 pilot's messing with their laptop computers while their plane flew past its destination the Administrator probably wouldn't want to be reading about a written agreement permitting air traffic controllers to use laptop computers while they work.  Yeah, probably a good thing not to put in writing. 
 
"Potomac is under great scrutiny because of the Trooper 2 crash."
The Trooper 2 crash from September, 2008?  It's January, 2010, and the FAA, scratch that, NATCA and the FAA, are just now getting around to addressing some of those important issues raised in the aftermath of the Trooper 2 crash?  REALLY!?  And this is it?  Training the mid FLMs how to effectively aid in search and rescue efforts after a plane crash will come later, we suppose.  Once all the scrutiny brought on by the crash wears off.  

First off, the "great scrutiny" line is used by management here to scare people into believing that whatever it is the FAA is doing is somehow warranted--just because managers say "we're under great scrutiny."  It's sorta like putting the NextGen tag on new technology-- hey, it's NextGen, here's a few million bucks to see if it works.  Now that the NATCA reps have bought into it they too can use the "we're under great scrutiny" line to make believers out of doubters that it's necessary to make an unwritten policy taking away a basic job function of FLMs and a tenet of management--the assignment of work.  Remember that one manager with a sixth sense. 

The TRACON air traffic manager won't put his new mid shift policy into writing.  But what he will do is put in writing what the policy is not.  With the touch of a threat of disciplinary action for good measure.  This ought to be a lesson to those who thought it was a good idea to collaborate with management in this endeavor to conceal wrongdoing by the FLMs:  They made you look like fools.   

Here's the written guidance to support the unwritten "agreement."  The highlighted text on page 2 is:   physically fit as needed by job requirements; and in a mentally alert condition to perform the duties of his/her position.  From the FAA's Standards of Conduct manual.  The third page is a copy from the NATCA/FAA contract briefing guide on Article 4 on the subject of radios and phones in the operational quarters.  What he's trying to say in so many words is that because the contract permits certain items in non-work areas that they are, thus, not permitted in work areas.  In other words, no laptops or DVD players in the control room. 
Mid Reminder

Can anyone guess what the author of this letter is trying to imply by highlighting the part about physically fit and mentally alert?  Sounds like the Boy Scout Oath except he left out the morally straight part.  But if you practice what you preach then that makes sense to leave it out.  But if the author is trying to say what we think he's trying to say but, as is so often the case, leaves it vague to create confusion,,,,,If we're not physically fit and mentally sound then go here?  From the FAA's Table of Penalties for misconduct:  47. Failure to perform duties while sleeping or exhibiting a sleep-like state when the employee occupies a position where safety of personnel or property is endangered.  1st offense: 14-day suspension to removal.  2nd offense: Removal.

What a way to set the tone for the efforts to mitigate controller fatigue issues.  From Article 55 of the NATCA/FAA Contract: 

Within sixty (60) days of the signing of this Agreement, the Parties agree to establish a workgroup to develop a fatigue management system. This workgroup shall consist of at least three members from each Party. The scope of the workgroup will be to identify and mitigate work place fatigue concerns. Recommendations reached within the workgroup shall be referred to the Parties for such action as they deem appropriate. Any bargaining obligations shall be handled in accordance with Article 7 of this Agreement.

(Might be a good idea NOT to pick anyone from the Potomac TRACON management team for this workgroup.  That is if there is any desire to maintain credibility going into this effort.)

Now this is what we call management-employee relations!  We're going to get a workgroup together to come up with some rules to cover-up for those that were forging records on the mids, then we're only going to brief half of the controllers, and none of the FLMs, and we won't put any of it in writing, and then we'll remind everyone that what they were (or will be) told in the briefing could lead to disciplinary action.  This is beyond eff-ed up.

It's been a couple weeks since the briefings began on management relinquishing their responsibility to assign work from 10pm to 6am at Potomac TRACON.  And then after a day or two--poof--no more briefings.  Just the letter on what not to do.  There are more questions than ever on what's expected when the controller--and FLM--show up for the mid, dead-ass tired with a few hours of sleep after a quick-turn, trying to make sense of three or four different interpretations and policies.  And for what?  Trooper 2?  A week ago management got rid of the controller who worked Trooper 2 before it crashed.  Isn't that enough?

Where we are today (or, tonight on the mid) is due to knee-jerk reactions by FAA managers to an imaginary problem which had nothing to do with the crash of Trooper 2, has nothing to do with efficiency or safety or productivity.  These managers are so far in to this charade that they can't get out of it without getting egg on their face.  Lucky for them they have a few collaborators to help them stay clean.

Are Front Line Managers Leading The Anti-Safety Culture?

Over the past year or so the FAA has been pushing a plan to change the safety culture within the agency.  A few ideas to improve safety in the nation's air traffic control system may have merit.  One idea which has already been implemented is the omission of the names of controllers from operational reports.  Time will tell how any new idea makes the skies any safer.  But we have to hand it to FAA Administrator Babbitt for trying.  But try as he may, Babbitt is being stymied by his own soldiers in the field.

Here are a couple paragraphs from a July 9, '09, FAA HQ press release announcing the changes to the OE reporting process.  Key words are highlighted.

New FAA Safety Culture Reflected in Operational Error Reporting

Effective immediately, the names of controllers will not be included in reports sent to FAA headquarters on operational errors, which occur when the proper distance between aircraft is not maintained. The controller’s identity will be known at the facility where the event took place. Necessary training will be conducted and disciplinary action taken, if appropriate. Both will be recorded in the controller’s record. Removing names on the official report will allow investigators to focus on what happened rather than who was at fault.

“We need quality information in order to identify problems and learn from incidents before they become accidents,” Babbitt said. “The best sources of that information are our front-line employees. Our success depends on their willingness to identify safety concerns.”

There's that line again about using disciplinary action for performance issues.  Like we wrote a couple days ago, don't be tricked by a supervisor.  If you're called into a performance meeting and aren't 100% sure that it won't turn into something else ASK FOR A REP.  Don't forget this.  Moving on....

This is important so we'll cut and paste it again.  From Administrator Babbitt on his plan to improve aviation safety:

“We need quality information in order to identify problems and learn from incidents before they become accidents,” Babbitt said. “The best sources of that information are our front-line employees. Our success depends on their willingness to identify safety concerns.”

Hard to argue with his words.  But those words aren't louder than the actions of just one of his Front Line Managers at Potomac TRACON.  For she has her own ideas on what's best (for her), how safety is promoted (through ignorance), and what is the definition of success (hers.) 

This Front Line Manager who looks the other way or otherwise suppresses the reporting of air traffic incidents is doing it for dual purposes.  She is 1) protecting her own ass when something went wrong that she should've/could've been able to prevent; 2) She thinks that improving the morale problems that she and the rest of the FAA's management team created over the past three years can be repaired by pretending nothing is wrong when things go awry.  She looks good to her bosses since errors don't happen on her watch--or at least that they know about-- and the controllers on her watch rest easy knowing that if something bad happens she's got their back. 

One slight problem with her logic and those that play along with her.  This particular form of irresponsibility is compromising not only safety but is undermining the goals the Administrator has made to fix the agency he inherited. 

This single Front Line Manager, in particular, is so far out of sync with the Administrator's ideas and runs so far contrary to the concept of a safety culture at the FAA.  If anyone thinks her plan to improve safety is better than the Administrator's then keep playing nice with her.  You too can be part of the team working to implode the Administrator's safety culture initiative.  Imagine the reward you'll get when the job is done.

Here's a sampling of how this Front Line Manager does her thing to improve safety. 

May, 2009:  Controller advised this Front Line Manager of an IFR Boeing 737 getting a TCAS resolution advisory (which happens when one plane gets real close to another plane.)  She reviews the audio/radar replay rendering it a "non-event since the incident occurred outside of Class B airspace."  Missing the part about the 737 entering another area/sector without coordination (that's called an operational deviation.) The 737 would have kept going straight-ahead into the path of departures off another airport had the pilot not alerted the controller about the TCAS RA.    

“We need quality information in order to identify problems and learn from incidents before they become accidents,” Babbitt said. “The best sources of that information are our front-line employees. Our success depends on their willingness to identify safety concerns.”

September, 2009: Controller advised this Front Line Manager of an IFR F16 that descended from 4,000 feet to 3,000 feet without a clearance to do so  (that's called a pilot deviation.)  Not missing a beat (or getting out of her chair in front of the computer at the FLM desk) she hollered out, not too loud, "have the pilot call."  Really!  Single pilot in an F16 at 400 knots, take out a pen and pad to take a message: "POSSIBLE PILOT DEVIATION, ADVISE YOU CONTACT POTOMAC TRACON AT 540 349 7541."  Really!  The controller didn't make that stupid transmission.  The Front Line Manager didn't do anything more either.  Yeah, what could possibly be the problem with an F16 zipping across the sky not adhering to altitude assignments from air traffic controllers.       

“We need quality information in order to identify problems and learn from incidents before they become accidents,” Babbitt said. “The best sources of that information are our front-line employees. Our success depends on their willingness to identify safety concerns.”

December, 2009:  Controller advised this Front Line Manager that he had to stop the descent of an IFR Airbus 320 to avoid losing separation with another aircraft climbing towards it.  The second aircraft was cleared by a controller in an adjacent area into the path of the descending A320 contrary to standard operating procedures (that's called an operational deviation.)  This FLM advised the adjacent area FLM what had occurred and he told her, "I don't see the problem."

Listen to the audio of this incident here.  (The voice has been altered.)  Sure sounded like a problem.

Three days later this Front Line Manager tells a subordinate about what happened saying "It was an operational deviation" and that she is going to propose a change to the SOP.  Great idea.  Preemption, proactive, prevention; predictable too.  A couple days later this Front Line Manager dropped the matter altogether. 

“We need quality information in order to identify problems and learn from incidents before they become accidents,” Babbitt said. “The best sources of that information are our front-line employees. Our success depends on their willingness to identify safety concerns.”

This is the environment which exists at this one TRACON.  This Front Line Manager is a creature of her surroundings.   

FAA Chief Operating Officer Hank Krakowski, speaking with ABC News Chief Investigative Correspondent Brian Ross at AtlantaFest, said "We have to get the Front Line Managers on board with what we're trying to do."  What are you trying to do, Hank?  According to FAA officials, there was also a special 'focus session' at AtlantaFest on improving the safety culture at the FAA. 

Unless this Front Line Manager skipped out on Hank's 'safety forum' then 'what we're trying to do' is make a mockery out of the people who have staked their reputations on getting us to a safety culture at the FAA.  (The good people know who they are.) 

There is a warped concept in that some people think suppressing the reporting of air traffic incidents is somehow supporting the Administrator's safety initiatives.  (Others just don't give a damn.)  This portrayal of irresponsibility is being conveyed to the real front line employees--air traffic controllers--as doing the right thing.  Is this really how the FAA Administrator wants his newest air traffic controllers indoctrinated into the 'just' culture? 

Says Administrator Babbitt, “It’s important to note that controllers remain accountable for their actions, but we’re moving toward a new era that focuses on why these events occur and what can be done to prevent them.”  When you see this Front Line Manager promoted you'll see what's really in focus.  The safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world is all about perception.  It's too bad the numbers lie.

Comment moderation.

A note to our readers about posting comments. Most of the time comments are moderated before posting which means that one of our editors has to manually approve it before it is seen on the blog. Sometimes we don't approve a comment if we don't feel it has any useful purpose to the conversation. What is useful is determined by us--not the commenter. A big reason for us to moderate comments is to eliminate spam that has infiltrated the blogger.com system.

Sometimes the comment function is not moderated. Typically we would not moderate comments when we are busy with research or writing something. During this non-moderation period there are comments posted that would not have made it past the editors during normal circumstances.

If a reader comes across a comment that is so outlandish or outrageous or offensive please make us aware of it. From time to time we will remove crazy comments. Like we did just this morning.

TPCAU Management

Bad press.

This is not the PR a PR executive wants.  The police car dashcam video of her field sobriety test.  The 34-year old and overweight daughter of  Congressman John Mica busted by Maitland, Florida, PD.  Innocent until proven guilty.  Blew .198

Check out the video. Let this be a lesson.  Don't get caught drinking and driving or this could be you.

After watching go here and leave a comment.

Why I need a rep.

Why do FAA managers and supervisors respond indignantly to an employee asking to be accompanied by a union representative when called into a meeting?  Why?  Because they have something to hide.  Point in question: On Sunday, January 10th, Potomac TRACON Front Line Manager Dave Waudby was tasked with investigating an air traffic incident reported to him by a controller working an aircraft at an unexpected altitude heading toward another aircraft that would soon be descending right through it. 

Soon after the incident FLM Waudby determined it to be a non-event (a lot of those around here.)  Although it's not as if FLM Waudby has the final say because many others will have listened to the audio and radar replay with the expressed option of calling it something else by the time this blog is published.  Later during the shift, the controller was summoned to the office by FLM Waudby and the first words heard we're "I want a rep." 

FLM Waudby didn't just fall off the turnip truck.  His quick reply was "no, it's a performance discussion."  This ploy to deny union representation is used often by FAA managers and supervisors systemwide.  Most just say no as a natural reaction.  Let the employee grieve it.  Who cares about rights or what is right. 

There are two things the controller considered when making his request for a union rep.  First, he had a reasonable belief that disciplinary action could result from the meeting.  We'll get into that down the page.  Second, that the FLM was conducting an investigation into the incident that just occurred.  Therefore, Article 64, Section 3, of our brand new contract would kick in.  It reads:The employee and his/her Union representative, if the employee so elects, shall be permitted to review relevant recordings available within the facility before being interviewed by the IIC or any agent of the Agency. 

What possibly could FLM Waudby stand to lose by denying the employee's request for a union rep?  For starters, the current management team is the same team that ran roughshod over air traffic controllers for the three years of the so-called imposed work rules.  "Just say no" was so easy after three years and there have been no signals strong enough to get the FLMs to change.  For sure, FAA management was rebuked when our contract was ratified and many are not taking too kindly to changing the color of their stripes.

Here's what the mediators wrote in their decision on the disputed contract articles:

Whatever else may be said of the White Book document, it is neither a
“Collective Bargaining Agreement” nor an “Agreement.” The abrupt imposed
changes in working conditions from the collectively negotiated Green Books to
the unilateral White Book was so profound, and spawned so much hostility and
distrust, that the labor-management relationship since has degenerated into a
state of dysfunctionality.

FLM Waudby can read this, he can read FLRA decisions, he can read contract articles.  All for nothing.  He will be told what to do and how to do it.  No matter if it's right, lawful, or prudent.  The FAA managers at Potomac TRACON are not remotely concerned about fixing what they broke.  And that's fine.  If the Administrator is happy with keeping things the way they have been then so is the management team at Potomac TRACON.  Uh, could someone please send the memo to the PCT air traffic manager.  The one from the Administrator about employee engagement.

Back to the story.  "I want a rep" is not a request made lightly.  What this controller knows--and what FLM Waudby knows since he wrote and signed the paperwork--is that the controller on display at the flight data position for the past however many months is there as a result of an operational deviation.  The order FLM Waudby signed led to the controller-on-display being demoted to a lower (pay) level facility.  (We'll be writing about his case in great detail real soon when we have all the paperwork together. Complete with FLM Waudby's order.)  So to think for a minute that there is not a reasonable belief that disciplinary action could occur is ludicrous.  FLM like Waudby and his managers would rather keep the "I'm in control" thing going and intimidate their subordinates into keeping their mouths shut.

If FLM Waudby and the managers at Potomac TRACON really put a moment of thought about safety before making that split-second decision of NO, YOU DON'T GET A REP! maybe, just maybe, things could be different.  How the dynamics would have changed if he'd have started from YES.  If these so-called managers (which is the opposite of leaders) would look at it from a perspective of open dialogue--employee collaboration--, to look at a problem and find a solution, maybe whatever happened--two airplanes on a collision course-- could be prevented from reoccurring.  Again, this would require FLM Waudby and his managers to change the color of their stripes.   (It's simpler to just say don't climb an aircraft to the altitude used by another; do your job; pay attention; what we're you thinking?  Pushing off whatever problem there may be to another place and time.--Head in the sand approach.)  

Instead, FLMs and managers will continue to cover up safety concerns whenever they can (it's not hard), harrass and intimidate controllers who speak out (even easier), and as each day passes the FAA Administrator will find it harder and harder to accomplish his goal of improving employee morale and getting to NextGen.  And all Dave had to do let him have a rep. 

The FAA has guides on linking performance to discipline, so don't think that we are covering uncharted territory.  The FAA policy manual for "Maintaining Discipline" starts off with An effective disciplinary and performance program is essential to the successful administration of these policies.  This Guidance and Advice Memorandum has more helpful hints on how to discipline for performance.  So when it comes to a FLM calling you unexpectedly to a "performance discussion meeting" don't believe anyone who tells you that it won't lead to disciplinary action.

We'll close with a few more documents that prove (if there are doubters) that FAA managers will discipline for performance issues.  A letter from an FAA Director threatening disciplinary action if a controller commits an operational error under certain circumstances.     
Positive Sep

Backed up by the Potomac TRACON air traffic manager.
CMposSep

And, more recently, validated by Potomac TRACON acting/temporary Operations Manager Kevin Cuthbertson (excerpted): 

This is the stuff the FAA wants to hide by refusing union representation to air traffic controllers when they are called into what is ostensibly a performance discussion but really is a ruse to preserve the status quo of the FAA's labor-management relations.

Senior FAA managers learn about leadership from Disney movie.

We interrupt this program to bring you a fascinating, if not stupendous, story from Washington, DC.

Yesterday afternoon (January 13th), senior managers of the Federal Aviation Administration were given lessons on leadership from none other than Walt Disney. Walt's dead but that doesn't mean something of value can't be had from a Disney movie to teach these folks a thing or two.

For two hours 45 top managers and directors of the FAA, led by Senior Vice President for Strategy and Performance John Pipes, viewed the American sports drama Remember The Titans. (Take a moment and watch the clip below.) Another hour was then spent talking about the leadership lessons learned from the flick. Our federal government in action. Strategy, performance, leadership. For real.

With AtlantaFest still fresh in the minds of FAA watchers--media, congress, bloggers, employees--we really thought that Pipes and Company would have done something to put the agency in a more flattering light. Something with purpose. A real good idea to shed the bad rap the FAA seems to be getting lately. This is the best idea from any of 45 managers? Learn leadership from Coach Herman Boone?

Not ones to disappoint, they've outdone themselves while they thought no one was looking. Mickey Mouse Management Training. (No disrespect meant toward Walt.) This venture is a drop in the bucket of taxpayer dollars wasted when compared with AtlantaFest. What's 45 managers hourly rate times three? Plenty! Your money. Wasted. Again. And this is the bunch who are going to shepherd upwards of $4 billion to bring NextGen to life?

It's painfully obvious that FAA leaders are having a rough go in the public relations arena as the sheltered world of the top brass is starting to tarnish; if not flat out rusting in place. How much more can they bear (or bare) before real changes are made to get us out of the ratings rut?

January is a great month to retire. Someone at the top, PLEASE, make the first move. Lead by example.

Innovative and creative thinking people are what the FAA needs at the top. Stale vice presidents who play Disney movies and call it leadership training along with managers who order controllers to play mahjongg and call it 'professionalism training' need to step aside to let the Next Generation in to move this agency in the right direction.

If the lead strategist for the Air Traffic Organization (that would be John Pipes) believes that real leadership can be learned from watching Disney movies then we're in for a hard slog to fix what ails the FAA.

Message to Pipes: Disney doesn't have the answers. He's dead. Try listening to your workforce instead. They see day in and out what works and what doesn't.

Enjoy the movie.

.

No DVD For You!

Drats!  Foiled again. 

We put a call out on our December 21, '09, blog for the DVD of the FAA's Got Talent show from December 16th.  One of our readers forwarded us a disappointing message from HQ which read "...the DVD will not be distributed due to unforeseen post-production issues."

Aw shucks.  Imagine what fun we could've had with a full length video.  AtlantaFest could have been just a side-show.  Whadderya gunna do?   

Controllers play games on the public dime.

From the Reader's Forum in the Terre Haute Tribune Star.

Air traffic control is not game play

I have to use care when I write letters to the editor concerning my job as an air traffic controller. For instance, if I disagree with a policy I can’t say that I oppose it, even if I think it’s stupid or moronic. I also can’t suggest that if you don’t like it either then you should call them at (812) 877-7730 and express concern. I can’t suggest that you contact your representatives to complain about any abusive waste of taxpayer dollars if I thought there was one.

That being said, this letter is intended to tell you about the unique and different new training program at the FAA.

Your employer would probably frown on your playing computer games at work but my employer has made it mandatory for me to play computer games, and your taxes pay me to do so. The FAA has made it compulsory that more than 14,000 air traffic controllers nationwide play 13 hours of games such as Mahjongg and even PacMan by the end of September.  Controllers were told that professional athletes and race-car drivers use this type of training successfully, and it should work for controllers too.

I sure hope it wasn’t the Indiana Pacers or Danica Patrick who used the program.

The FAA calls it NATPRO (National Air Traffic Professionalism Program), but it really is 13 hours of computer games, plus two hours of instruction on playing these games all under the pretext of “professional skill training”. Today the FAA paid me more than $59 for my hour of game playing (plus benefits). The FAA has assigned this mandatory “TRAINING” to all controllers nationwide at a cost of millions of dollars, and will result in controllers playing games when critical air traffic control decisions might need to be made.

I don’t even play Mahjongg at home because it’s a boring and dull game. At least one controller working overtime spent an hour on the games.

Job bank USA lists the 2002 average annual federal air traffic controllers salary at $97,500, which averages to around $47 per hour. With over 14,000 air traffic controllers nationwide, making an average $47 per hour, the 13 hours of game play plus the two hour orientation to the program (15 hours total), I estimate it will cost the FAA a minimum $9,870,000 plus benefits ($47.00 time 15 (hours) time 14,000 (controller work force) quals $9,870,000. In 2008 dollars it will certainly be more.

How does that make you feel, Mr. and Mrs. Taxpayer? You might wonder who’s watching the sky while controllers are playing computer games at a cost to you of nearly $10 million.

I’m not complaining. I enjoy making money playing computer games and I’m certain I’m learning, er, something here, at least I should be and I’m sure that by the end of the 13 hours I’ll see what it is I’m learning, I think.

I do wish they’d postpone this expensive training for a while at least and maybe replace the radar in Terre Haute with one that the manager at Terre Haute Tower has not branded faulty, but that’s another news story.

Wish me luck, I’ve got 12 more hours of demanding computer training coming my way in the next few weeks. I’m certain that it will make me a better air traffic controller and if I ever see PacMan on my RADAR I’ll know exactly what to do with him.

— Jim Kmetz
Terre Haute

The letter is from September 11, 2008. 

NATPRO is still played with used for training today in air traffic control facilities nationwide.  We wrote about the FAA wasting taxpayer dollars by having air traffic controllers play games and call it training last year.  Read it again here.

Most controllers have figured out that they can simply push the START button on the NATPRO games and walk away from the computer for 10 or 15 minutes, come back and do it all over again.  At Potomac TRACON, NATPRO has become something akin to making widgets.  When a slow weekend shift in the winter has a couple extra controllers the supervisor starts asking "Do you have your password for NATPRO?"  ---Sure do!  Then it's off to the computer lab for a few hours of fraud, waste, and abuse playing matching color games on company (taxpayer funded) time. 

And no one--NO ONE--can come up with statistics that show how NATPRO makes for a better air traffic controller which would, of course, make for a safer aviation system.  Maybe there were  reliable stats before controllers gamed the game.  Not now. 

Read more about what controllers have to say about NATPRO here at stuckmic.com.

It's no wonder the FAA can't be taken seriously when playing mahjonng and whack-a-mole is part of the air traffic controller training program.  It's a good thing the FAA Administrator hasn't put the NextGen tag on NATPRO.  What an embarrassment that would be.  Nothing that money couldn't overcome though.